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PATTERNS OF DRAFTING ERRORS
IN THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
AND HOW COURTS SHOULD RESPOND TO THEM
Gregory E. Maggs*
The following article, developed from the personal notes of
Professor Gregory E. Maggs, identifies eight recurring patterns of
drafting in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). For each of these
patterns, and for other idiosyncratic errors, the article recommends
specific judicial responses. These responses take advantage of many
of the UCC’s unique characteristics. While the problem of drafting
errors in the UCC may seem minor in light of the model code’s high
overall quality, the suggested responses can lead to a more efficient
and effective application of the statute.
I. Introduction
Fifty years ago, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI) accomplished one of the greatest legislative feats in the history of the United
States. They published the first official version of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),1 a massive model statute designed “to simplify, clarify
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions.”2 Now adopted
in over fifty jurisdictions,3 the UCC governs billions of consumer and
business transactions each year.4 Its provisions doubtlessly *82 will

*

Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I would like
to thank Dean Michael Young and the law school for their generous financial
assistance.
1
The first official version of the UCC, known as the “1952 Official Text,” was
published in 1951 and first adopted by Pennsylvania in 1953. See 1 William D.
Hawkland, Hawkland U niform Commercial C ode Series §1-1 01:1 (2000).
2
U.C .C. §1 -102 (2)(a) (2001).
3
See 1 Hawkland, supra note 1, §1 -101 :1.
4
Articles 3 and 4 alone govern the more than 65 billion checks written each
year. See Lucinda Harp er, Americans Wo n’t Stop Writing Checks-- Electronic
Paym ents Are Viewed as Too Complicated, Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1998, at A2
(providing statistics on c heck use). O ther articles of the UCC govern sales and
leases of good s, funds transfers, letters of credit, and other very common commercial subjects.
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continue to set standards for commercial practices well into the twenty-first
century.5
Over the course of the UCC’s long existence, the ALI and NCCUSL
constantly have sought to improve it. 6 During the past fifteen years alone,
they have added new articles on leases of goods and funds transfers, and
revised the articles on negotiable instruments, check collection, letters of
credit, bulk transfers, investment securities, and secured transactions.7
More revisions may appear soon.8
Despite all of their efforts, however, the ALI and NCCUSL have not
eradicated one of the UCC’s most intractable difficulties, namely, its
numerous drafting errors.9 As this article will show, the UCC’s provisions

5

See Neil B. Cohen & Barry L. Zaretsky, Drafting Comm ercial L aw for the
New Millennium: W ill the Current Process Suffice?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 551, 553
(1993) (discussing the future of the UC C).
6
See Fred H . Miller, Realism Not Idealism in Uniform Laws-- Observations
from the Revision of the UCC, 39 S. Tex. L. Rev. 707, 712-17 (1998) (describing
the UCC revision process).
7
These recent revisions began in 1987 when the ALI and NCCU SL added a new
Article 2A on leases of goods, see U.C.C. art. 2A (1987), 1B U.L.A. 647 (19 89),
and revised Article 6, see id. at art. 6 (1987), 2C U.L.A. 5 (1991). In 1989, they
added a new A rticle 4A on fund s transfers, see id. art. 4A (1989), 2B U.L.A. 455
(1991), and again revised Article 6, this time recommending its elimination, see id.
art. 6 (1989), 2C U.L.A. 7 (1991). In 1990, they completely revised Article 3 on
nego tiable instruments, see id. art. 3 (19 90), 2 U.L.A. 5 (1991), and substantially
amended Article 4 on bank deposits and collections, see id. art. 4 (1990), 2B U.L.A.
5 (1991). In the same year, they also revised the new Article 2A on leases of good s.
See id. art. 2A (1990), 1B U.L.A. 207 (Supp . 2001). In 19 94, the y revised Article
8 on investment securities. See id. art. 8 (1994 ), 2C U.L.A. 47 (Supp. 2000). In
1995, they revised Article 5 on letters of cred it. See id. art. 5 (1995), 2B U.L.A. 154
(Supp. 2001). In 2000, they revised Article 9 on secured transactions. See id . art.
9 (2000 ), 3 U .L.A. 5 (2000) (effective July 1, 2001 ).
8
The ALI and NCCUSL are revising Articles 1, 2, and 2A. See State Law
Commission Appoints New G roup to Finish Drafting Work on Articles 2, 2A, 68
U.S.L.W . 2120 (A ug. 31, 1999) (describing the status of the work). They also have
formed committees to consider other articles. See Uniform Law C omm issioners:
The National C onference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Drafting
Pro jects Und erway, at http:// www.nccusl.org/uccusl/draftingprojects.asp (last
visited S ept. 4, 200 1).
9
The term “drafting error” has no universally accepted definition. I use the term
to refer to statutory language in the UC C that fails to produce the results that the
drafters wanted or that produces unintended and unforeseen results. Professor John
Copeland Nagle has suggested the alternative term “statutory mistakes” to describe
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often do not say either what the drafters intended or what they probably
would have intended if they had foreseen all of the issues that might arise.
Accordingly, courts often face considerable difficulty in applying the
UCC’s rules and avoiding insensible results.
Several years ago, I began keeping notes on problematic UCC sections.
Although I initially kept my list of drafting errors merely for reference
purposes, my interest in the various mistakes expanded as the list grew
larger. Eventually, I started thinking about the possibility of drawing*83
conclusions about the nature of these drafting errors and about making
general recommendations for handling them. This article presents some of
my conclusions.
10

Although all legislation contains drafting errors, the UCC has two
features that may make its drafting errors more problematic than similar
errors in other statutes. First, the UCC addresses a very complex subject
matter that puzzles courts even when its provisions contain no mistakes.
Second, as explained more fully below, the UCC’s status as a model law
enacted separately in over fifty jurisdictions makes correcting errors by
legislative amendment very difficult.
On the other hand, despite these difficulties, the UCC also appears to
have three characteristics that may help courts deal with its drafting errors.
First, most UCC drafting errors fall into a small set of recurring patterns.
In particular, the following eight types of problems appear again and again:
* The UCC does not have a rule to cover all cases.
* The UCC does not treat special cases differently.
* The UCC uses undefined ambiguous terms.
* The UCC uses circular definitions or cross-references.
* The UCC uses words and phrases inconsistently.

at least in part what I mean by drafting errors. See John Copeland Nagle,
Corrections Day, 43 UC LA L. R ev. 126 7, 126 8 (1996). Professor N agle elaborates:
“What constitutes a ‘mistake,’ of course, is often in the eye of the beholder.
Sometimes Congress writes statutes with language that produces unintended
conseq uences, sometimes Congress fails to resolve an issue because of an oversight
or a failure of will.... In the broadest sense, these are all statutory mistakes.” Id. at
126 7-68 .
10
These sections came to my attention from reading case s, providing advice to
lawyers, answering student questions, or just attempting to decipher the rules
myself.
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* The UCC fails to indicate which rule applies when the elements of a
provision are not satisfied.
* The UCC uses referents with unclear antecedents.
* The UCC contains rules that conflict with each other.
Fortunately, errors within each of these patterns often lend themselves
to common judicial responses.
Second, the UCC affords courts various means of dealing with drafting
errors that are not always possible with other kinds of legislation. In many
instances, courts can find ways around drafting errors by supplementing the
UCC with common-law rules.11 At other times, courts may conclude that
the parties have waived or altered the relevant UCC provisions by express
or implied agreement.12 In addition, nothing in the UCC bars courts from
applying the UCC in cases where its scope is unclear.13
Third, the stakes generally are not great when courts interpret the UCC.
Because the UCC mostly consists of default rules for private *84 commercial contracts, parties usually can avoid the consequences of interpretations
that they disfavor by contracting around them in the future.14 Accordingly,
when confronting drafting errors, courts may focus more of their attention
on easy issues like preserving uniformity, 15 and less on more difficult
questions about the substantive merits of the rules that their interpretations
create.

11

See U.C.C. §1-103 (20 01) (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of
this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law
relative to cap acity to co ntract, principa l and agent, esto ppe l, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause
shall supplem ent its pro visions.”).
12
See id. §1-102(3) (“The effect of p rovisions of this Act may be varied by
agree ment, except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations
of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care p rescrib ed by this Act may not be
disclaim ed by agreement....”).
13
See 1 Hawkland, supra note 1, §1-102:10 & n.2 (discussing this practice);
Daniel E. Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 39 F ordham L. Rev. 447 , 451 (1971 ) (discussing the same
practice).
14
See U.C.C. §1-102(3) (permitting the parties to vary provisions of the UCC
by agreement).
15
See id. §1-102(1), (2)(c) (directing courts to construe the UC C to p romote its
unde rlying purposes, which includ e making the law uniform).
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Part II of this article provides an overview of the problem of drafting
errors in the UCC.16 It first describes the UCC and its recent massive
revisions. It then discusses the prevalence of drafting errors in the UCC,
and how courts inevitably must address them. Part III discusses the eight
recurring patterns of drafting problems in the UCC identified above.17
After providing examples of each pattern, the discussion proposes
categorical ways that courts might deal with them. The recommendations
all take advantage of the special relationship of the UCC to both the
common law and to private agreements, allowing courts to remain faithful
to the statutory language while minimizing unintended results. Part IV
illustrates how considerations specific to the UCC may guide judges in
dealing with drafting errors that do fall within the eight patterns addressed
in Part III.18 Finally, Part V states a brief conclusion.19
II. Overview of the Problem
A. The Modern UCC
Since its formation at the end of the nineteenth century, 20 the NCCUSL
has sought to create model state laws and to urge state legislatures to enact
them. During the first half of the twentieth century, much of the NCCUSL’s
efforts concerned commercial law. The organization, for example,
promulgated and obtained widespread enactment of the Uniform Sales Act
(USA) and the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL). 21
In the 1940s, the NCCUSL decided to build upon its success with the
USA and the NIL by creating the UCC.22 The leaders of the project
intended the UCC to modernize the USA and NIL, and correct numerous
problems resulting from drafting errors and oversights in these *85 laws.23
They also decided that the UCC should govern other commercial subjects,
like bank collections, letters of credit, bulk transfers, documents of title,
investment securities, and secured transactions.24

16

See infra Pa rt II.
See infra Pa rt III.
18
See infra Pa rt IV.
19
See infra Pa rt V.
20
See Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Service--A Centennial History of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 17-18 (1991)
(desc ribing the mo vement for uniform state laws).
21
See 1 Hawkland, supra note 1, §1 -102 :3.
22
See 1 id. §1-101 :1.
23
See 1 id.
24
See 1 id.
17

PATTE RNS O F DRAFTING ERRORS IN THE U.C.C. CODE

6

With the assistance of the ALI, the NCCUSL completed the first official
version of the UCC in 1951. 25 Over the next two decades, the NCCUSL
and ALI revised the UCC in various ways. Because of their great efforts,
every state (except Louisiana), the District of Columbia, and various
federal territories and possessions have adopted the UCC in its entirety.26
Most observers would agree that the UCC has greatly improved the
commercial law and simplified the planning and resolution of commercial
transactions.27
Starting about fifteen years ago, the ALI and NCCUSL began an
ambitious project to update and expand the UCC. This project produced
new versions of the eight articles, described above.28 In addition, the ALI
and NCCUSL currently are working on other changes. For most of the past
decade, they have been drafting a new version of Article 2 on sales.29 They
also are revising Article 2A on leases,30 and planning to amend Article 1.31
When finished, they will have changed the entire UCC except for Article
7 on documents of title.
The additions to the UCC have done much good. Article 2A on leases
of goods has freed courts from the difficult task of trying to apply Article

25

See 1 id.
See 1 id. Louisiana and P uerto Rico have a dop ted some of the UCC. See
Christian Callens, Comment, Louisiana Civil Law and the Uniform Commercial
Code: Interpreting the New Louisiana U.C.C.-Inspired Sales Articles on Price, 69
Tul. L. Rev. 1649, 165 0-51 (1995 ) (discussing the UCC in Louisiana); Negotiab le
Instruments and Banking Transactions Act, 1996 P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 19, §401
(Sup p. 19 97) (ado pting A rticles 3, 4 , and 4 A in P uerto Rico ).
27
See James J. W hite & Ro bert S. Sum mers, Uniform Commercial Code §8, at
21-2 2 (3d ed. 198 8) (ex pressing this view ).
28
See M iller, supra note 6 , at 712 -17.
29
See Uniform Law Co mmissioners: The National Conference of Commissioners on U niform S tate Law, Drafting Committee to Revise Uniform Commercial
Code, Article 2, Sales and Article 2 A, Leases, at http :// www.nccusl.org/nccu sl/
draftingprojects.asp (last visited Aug. 21, 2001) (identifying committee members
and providing links to drafts of the revisions).
30
See id .
31
See Uniform Law Co mmissioners: The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Drafting Committee to Revise Uniform Commercial
Code Article 1, General Provisions, at http:// www.nccusl.org/nccusl/draftingp
rojects.asp (last visited Aug. 21, 2001) (identifying the drafting committee and
providing links to drafts of the revision).
26
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2’s provisions on sales of goods by analogy to cases involving leases. 32
Similarly, Article 4A has supplanted general common-law principles of
contract and tort with a well-drafted set of rules to govern the trillions of
dollars moved every day by funds transfers.33
*86 The revisions also have improved previously existing portions of
the UCC. Some of the changes have made the UCC more compatible with
modern business practices. For example, the revised version of Article 3
now allows negotiable instruments to have variable interest rates,34 and
also permits the electronic presentation of negotiable instruments.35 Other
changes have established rules to govern situations that courts previously
dealt with on a common-law basis. The revised version of Article 4, for
instance, establishes encoding warranties for use in connection with
automatic check processing.36
All but a very few of the states have adopted, or are in the process of
adopting, the revisions discussed. 37 The ambitious nature of the amendments and additions makes this accomplishment very impressive. The credit
certainly belongs to the careful and professional drafting by the NCCUSL
and ALI.
B. The Problem of Drafting Errors
Despite the great success that the UCC and its revisions have had in
obtaining legislative approval, no one considers them perfect. In some
instances, the UCC has fallen behind developments in the law or in
commercial practices. For example, despite its recent enactment in 1987
and amendment in 1990, Article 2A on leases of goods does not contain an
exception to the statute of frauds for electronic transactions.38

32

See, e.g., B arco Auto Leasing Corp. v. PSI Cosmetics, Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d
505, 509-11 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1984) (providing an example of this technique and
explaining ho w other courts have used it).
33
See 6 A H awkland, sup ra note 1, §4 A-10 1:01 .
34
See U .C.C. §3-1 12(b) (1990 ).
35
See id . §3-5 01(b)(1 ).
36
See id . §4-2 09.
37
See T he Nat’l Conference of Comm ’rs on Uniform State Laws, Introductions
& Ado ption of Uniform Acts, at http://www.nccusl.org/uniformacts_ subjectmatter.
asp (last visited Sep. 4, 2001 ) (providing current information about adoptions of the
UC C revisions).
38
See, e.g., U.C.C. §2A -201(1)(b) (2001 ) (requiring a signed writing for leases
of goods where total payments exceed $100 0).

PATTE RNS O F DRAFTING ERRORS IN THE U.C.C. CODE

8

In other situations, critics have charged that the UCC has perpetuated
antiquated legal doctrines. For example, prior to its revision, numerous
writers questioned whether Article 3 on negotiable instruments should
retain the holder in due course doctrine.39 The 1990 revision, however, did
not change the historic rules. 40 Some writers have expressed great anguish
over the UCC’s resistance to fundamental revision.41
*87 This article, however, focuses on the problem of drafting errors. As
used here, the term drafting error refers only to inadvertent mistakes or
omissions in the phrasing of UCC provisions that tend to obscure the
meaning of its rules or tend to prevent them from having their intended
effects. The term does not refer to erroneous policy choices or failures to
foresee future developments.
The revisions to the UCC inadvertently introduced scores of serious
drafting errors. Their existence has not remained secret. Scholars have
complained sharply about them.42 The ALI and NCCUSL even formed a
committee specifically to address drafting problems in Articles 3, 4, and
4A.43
Some drafting errors probably were inevitable. The UCC contains
hundreds of pages of complex rules. No matter how carefully the drafters
39

See, e.g., Albe rt J. Ro senthal, Negotiability--Who Needs It?, 71 Colum. L.
Rev. 375 , 401 (1971) (concluding that “tod ay, nego tiability, and specifically the
protections of holders in due course, are not necessary or even helpful in fostering
the flow of commerce”); Vern Countryman, The Holder in Due Course and Other
Anachronisms in Consumer Credit, 52 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 2-11 (1973) (providing a
similar critique); Ralph J. Rohner, Holder in Due C ourse in Consumer Transactions:
Requiem, Revival, or Reformation, 60 Cornell L. Rev. 503, 515 (1975) (providing
another critique).
40
See U.C.C. §§3 -305 (b), 3-306 (2001) (allowing hold ers in due co urse to take
nego tiable instruments free of most defenses, claim s in reco upm ent, and compe ting
claims of ownership ).
41
See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Learning from Lord Mansfield: Toward a
Transferability Law for Modern Commercial Practice, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 775, 788
(1995).
42
Sarah Howard Jenkins, Revised Article 3: “[Revise] It Again, Sam”, 36 Ho us.
L. Rev. 883, 884 -85 (1999) (com plaining of “traps for the unwary” and “serious
omissions”).
43
See U niform Law Com missioners: National Conference of Comm issioners on
Uniform State Laws, Drafting Comm ittee to Prepare Amendm ents to the Uniform
Commercial Code, A rticle 3, N egotiable Instrum ents, Article 4, Bank De posits and
Collection, and Article 4A, Funds Transfers, at http:// www.nccusl.org/draftingproj
ects.asp (last visited Sept. 17, 2001 ).
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and revisers checked and rechecked their work, they could not foresee
every situation that might arise or eliminate every ambiguity their
provisions might create.44 In addition, the drafters may not have had clear
incentives to avoid drafting errors.45 The question considered here is what
to do about the problem.
Legislatures can amend statutes to correct any drafting errors. If they
take this action, they improve the clarity and often the substance of the law.
They also spare judges the difficulty of deciding how to respond to
ambiguities that might affect the cases before them.
Unfortunately, legislatures almost certainly will not correct the vast
majority of drafting errors in the UCC. In addition to the usual difficulties
involved in passing legislation,46 lawmakers know that unless they act at
the specific recommendation of the NCCUSL, they risk reducing the
uniformity of the statute. If each state passes its own amendments to deal
with drafting errors, many would choose different solutions. While
correcting individual drafting errors, they would create conflicts among the
jurisdictions.
*88 The NCCUSL and ALI certainly may suggest and lobby for uniform
amendments for correcting drafting problems in the UCC. This process has
occurred in the past, but in general, rather infrequently. These bodies have
other important work to accomplish. They also may hesitate to recommend
changes to the UCC without having confidence that every jurisdiction will
pass them. 47

44

But see Steven L. Schwarz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory
Rulemaking Process of Private Legislatures, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 909, 928-45 (1995)
(suggesting constraints that m ight improve the drafting of the UCC and other
uniform statutes); Steven O. Weise, “Plain English” Will Set the UCC Free, 28 L oy.
L.A. L. Rev. 371, 371-73 (1994) (arguing that better drafting could reduce
erroneous decisions under the U CC).
45
See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595, 616 (1995) (noting that drafters of model laws
may have a n incentive to create ambiguity because the y may want attorneys to turn
to them for exp ert advice in the future).
46
Passing legislation generally requires the coordinated efforts of numerous
politicians. They are unlikely to expend this effort often to fix mistakes in areas of
commercial law unless their constituents or campaign supporters have strong
reaso ns for ca ring ab out the chang es.
47
See William J. Woodward, Jr., Private Legislation in the United States--How
the Uniform Commercial Code Becomes Law, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 451, 459-60
(1999) (discussing NCCUS L’s reluctance to propose changes to the UCC that might

10
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Courts, therefore, inevitably have to deal with most drafting errors in the
UCC. This task is not easy. As noted above, the UCC addresses a difficult
subject matter unfamiliar to many judges.48 To make matters worse, no
court can establish a definitive interpretation for all of the jurisdictions that
have adopted the UCC. The state supreme courts can determine the
meaning of the UCC as enacted only in their own states. They cannot
determine the meaning that courts in other jurisdictions must give it.49
The ALI and NCCUSL have attempted to address these problems in part
by establishing a committee of commercial law experts known as the
Permanent Editorial Board (PEB).50 The PEB acts by issuing “commentary” on UCC issues.51 These commentaries serve to resolve ambiguities

not be ado pted and o ther problems).
48
The drafters of the UCC attempted to address this problem by making the
UCC straightforward and easy to understand. See Taylor v. Roeder, 360 S.E.2d
191, 195 (Va. 198 7) (“T he U CC introduced a degree of clarity into the law of
commercial transac tions which permits it to be app lied by laymen daily to countless
transactions without resort to judicial interpretation.”). This effort, however, never
fully succeeded. In many instances, a reader can understand the UCC only if he or
she already knows what it is trying to say. See, e.g., James S. Rogers, Policy
Perspectives on Revised UCC Article 8, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1431, 1448 (1996)
(discussing an example from Article 8 on investment securities). Indeed, some
observers have called for completely rethinking the format of the UCC. Professor
Lary Lawrence, for examp le, has pleaded for what he calls a “user-friendly” statute.
See Lary Lawrence, What W ould Be W rong with a User-Friendly Code? : The
Drafting of Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial C ode , 26 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 659 (1993). He a sserts:
A commercial code must be intelligible to lawyers who are not well-versed
in com merc ial prac tices or in the history of commercial law .... Judicial
opinions in this area often reflect a judge’s lack of understanding.... The
drafters should assist the co urts in interpreting the Code b y clearly and
com prehensively stating all the applicable rules.
Id. at 671.
49
See 1 Hawkland, supra note 1, §1-102:08 (explaining that cases from other
jurisdictions have only persuasive authority). Because the UCC is state law,
moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has no power to establish its meaning. See
United States v. Kimbell Fo ods, Inc., 44 0 U .S. 71 5, 72 4-28 (1979) (contrasting
UCC state law with federal common law, the latter o f which m ay govern the rights
of the U nited S tates in certain commercial transactio ns).
50
See Permanent Editorial Bd., PEB Resolution on Purposes, Standards and
Pro cedures for PE B C omm entary to the UCC, 3B U.L.A. 60 0 (1992 ).
51
See id .
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and correct judicial misinterpretations.52 They generally follow a *89
standard format of presenting an issue, a discussion, and conclusion. The
discussion describes the statutory scheme, the interpretative problem that
it presents, and the various cases that have attempted to resolve the issue.
The idea of having expert members of the PEB provide guidance about
problems in the UCC is certainly sound. The PEB, moreover, has done
excellent work. The commentaries are thorough and well researched. In
general, their recommendations have strong arguments in their favor.
Although courts have no obligation to follow the PEB commentaries, they
generally should give them great weight.
Despite their theoretical appeal, the PEB commentaries have two major
practical shortcomings as a solution to the problem of drafting errors in the
UCC. First, the PEB does not issue a sufficient number of commentaries
to resolve the vast majority of ambiguities that arise. Since 1987, it has
promulgated a total of only fifteen commentaries.53 Yet, the revisions to
the UCC alone have introduced scores of new drafting errors. Second, the
PEB commentaries to date have not caught the attention of the courts. A
recent computer search found a total of only twenty-five reported cases that

52

The PE B comm entaries described their purposes as follows:

(1) to resolve an ambiguity in the UCC by restating more clearly what the
PEB considers to be the legal rule; (2) to state a preferred resolution of an
issue on which judicial opinion or scholarly writing diverges; (3) to
elabo rate on the application of the UCC where the statute and/or the Official
Comm ent leaves doubt as to inclusion or exclusion of, or application to,
particular circumstances or transactions; (4) consistent with UCC
§1-102(2)(b), to apply the p rinciples of the UCC to new or changed
circumstances; (5) to clarify or elaborate upon the operation of the UCC as
it relates to other statutes (such as the Bankruptcy Code and various federal
and state consumer protection statutes) and general principles of law and
equity pursuant to UCC §1-103; or (6) to otherwise improve the operation
of the U CC.
Id. PEB commentary are published in a variety of sources and also are available on
the W EST LAW database . To find the commentary on Westlaw, search for
“PR (‘PE B C OM MEN TA RY ’)” in the “U LA” datab ase.
53
See Permanent Editorial B d., PEB Commentaries on the UCC Nos. 1-9, 3B
U.L.A. 59 9-64 4 (1992 ); id. Nos. 10 -15 3 B U .L.A. 1 27-7 2 (Su pp. 2 001 ).
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have cited the PEB’s commentary.54 As a result, the PEB commentary has
not had a large impact on the UCC.
In sum, the revisions to the UCC have introduced numerous drafting
errors. State legislatures are not going to correct most of these errors. PEB
commentary is going to provide guidance on only a handful of topics. As
result, courts inevitably will have to deal with most of the ambiguities
themselves. This article seeks to provide some guidance.
C. A Methodological Note
Before getting into the details of my recommendations about how courts
should address drafting errors, one preliminary methodological point
requires mention. In suggesting ways that courts might deal with drafting
errors in the UCC, I have assumed that courts may not simply ignore or
reject applicable statutory language. 55 Accordingly, the recommendations*90 pay careful attention to what the UCC says, even when inaptly
written. If courts for whatever reason do not feel bound by the enacted text
of statutes,56 then drafting errors will present them with much less
difficulty, and many of the details of these recommendations will seem
irrelevant.
III. Recommendations for Recurring Drafting Errors

54

Search for (PE B “P ER MAN EN T E DIT OR IAL BO ARD” “P.E .B.”) W /3
COMM ENTARY in WE STLA W ’s UCC-CS d atabase. The reason that on ly a small
number of cases have cited the PEB remains unclear. One strong possibility is that
judges and litigants simply lack familiarity with the PEB commentary as an
impo rtant sou rce of persuasive authority.
55
Put another way, this article takes for granted the principle of “legislative
supre macy,” which is the principle that legislation binds cour ts. See Daniel A.
Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. L.J. 281,
283-94 (1989) (defining and discussing legislative supremacy). According to the
principle of legislature supremacy, courts must follo w statutory com mands, eve n if
they disagree with them as a matter of po licy. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Supreme Court 1983 Term, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 4, 60 (1984) (“Judges must be honest agents of the political branches.
They carry out de cisions they do not make.”).
56
See M ichael S. Fried, A Theo ry of Scrivener’s Error, 52 Rutgers L. Rev. 589,
590 (2000) (noting that througho ut history m any co urts have refused to follow
obvious errors in statutory language); Jo nathan R. Siegel, T extualism and
Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 1023, 1033-40 (1998)
(describing and comm ending instances in which courts have declined to adopt the
textual meaning of statutes when considerations of context have pointed th em in
other directions).
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In keeping track of drafting errors encountered in the UCC, I have
observed that most of them appear to fall into eight recurring patterns. The
following discussion describes these patterns and provides numerous
examples. It also recommends categorical approaches that judges might
use to address them. Although courts certainly can and should rely on all
of their usual techniques for interpreting statutes, my recommendations
attempt to take advantage of various special features of the UCC. These
features may ease the task confronting courts.
A. The UCC Does Not Have a Rule to Cover All Cases
Drafters of legislation sometimes state rules that accidentally fail to
address certain possible situations that may arise. This type of error tends
to occur when the drafters focus their attention on the most common fact
patterns, and forget about those that occur less frequently. Eventually
litigation may cause a court to confront a type of case that the drafters
overlooked.
1. Examples
The most famous example of this type of drafting error appears in
section 2-207,57 which creates an exception to the common law’s mirror
image rule.58 Section 2-207(1) states that a purported acceptance of an
offer may suffice to form a contract even if it contains additional or
different terms.59 Section 2-207(2) then states how courts should treat any
*91 additional terms contained in the offer.60 The section, however,

57

See U .C.C. §2-2 07 (200 1).
The mirror image rule says that an attempted acceptance of an offer is not an
acceptance if it differs from the offer. See Restatement (Second) of the Law of
Contracts §59 (1981) (“A rep ly to an offer which purp orts to accep t it but is
conditional on the offeror’s assent to terms add itional to or different from those
offered is not an a ccep tance but is a co unter-offer.”).
59
See U .C.C. §2-2 07(1). T he Code states:
58

A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the
add itional or different terms.
60
See id . §2-2 07(2). T he Code states:
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for additions to the
contract. Betwee n mercha nts such terms become p art of the contract unless:
(a) the o ffer expressly limits ac ceptance to the term s of the offer;
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notoriously fails to specify how courts should treat different terms.61
Courts, for many years, have struggled to resolve the question.62
A second example of this type of drafting error appears in revised
section 3-404(b). Section 3-404(b) states that, when a person issues a
negotiable instrument to an impostor, anyone may negotiate the instrument
by indorsing it in the name of the impostor.63 In focusing on impostors who
take instruments from issuers, however, the drafters overlooked the
possibility that impostors also might take instruments by transfer or
negotiation. For example, suppose that Mansfield issues a check to
Llewellyn, who specially indorses the check to make it payable to Gilmore.
An impostor might pretend to be Gilmore and induce Llewellyn to deliver
the check to him.64 Section 3-404(b), however, does not cover this situation
because it only addresses instruments issued to impostors, not instruments
negotiated or transferred to them.65
A third example appears in section 4A-207(a), which concerns
misdescription of a payment order’s beneficiary. Section 4A-207(a) says,
“[i]f, in a payment order received by the beneficiary’s bank, the name, bank
account number, or other identification of the beneficiary refers to a

(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of obje ction to them has alrea dy been given or is given
within a reasonable tim e after no tice of them is received .
61
See id .
62
See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pe nnwalt Corp ., 741 F.2d 1 569, 157 8-80 (10th Cir.
198 4) (discussing variou s app roaches to the pro blem ).
63
See U .C.C. § 3-404(b). T he Code states:
If (i) a person whose intent determines to wh om a n instrume nt is payab le
(Section 3-110(a) or (b)) does not intend the person identified as payee to
have any interest in the instrument, or (ii) the person identified as payee of
an instrument is a fictitious person, the following rules apply until the
instrument is negotiated by spe cial end orsem ent:
(1) Any person in p ossession of the instrum ent is its hold er.
(2) An endorsem ent by any person in the name of the payee stated in
the instrument is effective as the endo rsement of the payee in favor of a
person who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value or for
collection.
Id.

64

Cf. Cohen v. Lincoln Sav. Bank of Brooklyn, 10 N.E.2d 457 (N.Y. 1937)
(payee nego tiated rather than issued check to imp ostor).
65
See U .C.C. § 3-404(b).

PATTE RNS O F DRAFTING ERRORS IN THE U.C.C. CODE

15

nonexistent or unidentifiable person or account, no person has rights as a
beneficiary of the order and acceptance of the order cannot occur.”66 In
writing this section, the drafters evidently were thinking of a situation in
which a payment order would contain only one identification of any
existing beneficiary (such as either a name or an account number). They
*92 overlooked the possibility that a payment order might state the name
of the beneficiary correctly but refer to a nonexistent account number.67
The UCC contains many similar examples of cases inadvertently not
covered by any particular rule.68
2. Recommended Judicial Response
How should courts deal with UCC provisions that for one reason or
another fail to address certain cases because of drafting oversights? Some
courts might be tempted not to deal with them at all. They might assert
that, as judges, they have a duty to interpret legislation as written; if a
66

See id . §4A -207 (a).
See 64 W illiam D. H awkland & Richard D . Moreno, H awkland Uniform
Commercial Code Series § 4A-207:01 (1999) (“It does not ap pear that this ano maly
in subsection 4A-207(a) was intended....”); R obe rt L. Jordan et al., Ne gotiab le
Instruments, Paym ents and Credits 277 (5th ed. 2000) (“Section 4A-207(b ) contains
a drafting error and should be amende d.”). The drafters did anticipate the possibility
that the payment orde r would state the bene ficiary’s nam e correctly bu t refer to an
existing account of another perso n. See U.C .C. §4 A-20 7(b).
68
For instance, Section 3-201(b) indicates the manner of negotiation for an
instrument payable to “an identified person,” but does not say how an instrument
is negotiated when it is payable to more than one identified person, although
Section 3-110(d) makes clear that instruments payable to more than one identified
person may be negotiated. See U.C.C. §§3-201(b), -110(d). Similarly, Section
3-303(b) establishes lack of consideration and failure of consideration as defenses
that the maker or drawer of an instrument may assert, but does not state whether
indorsers may assert lack of considera tion or failure of consideration as a defenses.
See id. §3-303(b); id. §3-305(a)(2) (noting that the right to enforce an instrument
is subject to ord inary defense on a contract); cf. id. §3-41 9(b) (stating that a n
accommodation party, which would include an anomalous indorser, may not raise
lack of consideration as defense). Likewise, Section 3-301 indicates that holders
and persons who have lost their instruments may enforce, that transferees of holders
may enforce, not whether transferees of persons who have lost their instrum ents
may enforce. See id. §3-301 (“’Person entitled to enforce’ an instrume nt means (i)
the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who
has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who
is entitled to enforc e the instrument pursuant to Section 3-309 [i.e., a loser].”); see
also Bobby D. Assocs. v. DiMarcantonio, 751 A.2d 673 (Pa. Super. 2000)
(considering whether the assignee of right to enforc e lost no te may enforce).
67
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legislature makes an omission in drafting a statute, courts have neither the
responsibility nor the power to correct it.
In Corfan Banco Asuncion Paraguay v. Ocean Bank,69 a court took this
position when interpreting section 4A-207(a). The court recognized that the
section contained the oversight discussed above. Indeed, the court even
quoted a leading treatise which explained that “it does not appear that this
anomaly in section 4A-207(a) was intended.”70 The court nonetheless
refused to apply the section to a payment order that correctly identified the
beneficiary by name but referred to a nonexistent account.71 Justifying its
decision, the court quoted a case called Weber v. Dobbins, which said:
The reason for the rule that courts must give statutes their plain and
ordinary meaning is that only one branch of government may write *93
laws. Just as a governor who chooses to veto a bill may not substitute a
preferable enactment in its place, courts may not twist the plain wording of
statutes in order to achieve particular results. Even when courts believe the
legislature intended a result different from that compelled by the unambiguous wording of a statute, they must enforce the law according to its terms.72
This statement expresses the basic philosophy of the “textualist” school
of statutory interpretation, which has become prevalent in recent years.73
Similar statements and reasoning appear in the recent decisions of
numerous state and federal courts. Adherents to this view (including the
author74 ) recognize that following the text of a statute sometimes will not
produce optimal results in particular cases, but believe that any other
approach lacks legitimacy and will have worse overall effects on the legal
system. Accordingly, if a textualist court came across an oversight in the
Bankruptcy Code or an unintended loophole in the Internal Revenue Code,
it generally would not attempt to correct the problem. On the contrary, like
the court in Corfan, it would apply the statute as written.75 The court would
leave it to Congress to remedy the drafting error.
69
715 So. 2d 967, 969-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d dismissed, 728 So.
2d 2 03 (199 8).
70
Id. (quoting William D. Hawkland & Richard Moreno, Uniform Commercial
Code Series § 4A-2 07:0 1 (1993 )).
71
See id . at 968 .
72
Id. at 970 (quo ting W eber v. Do bbins, 616 So. 2 d 95 6 (Fla. 199 3)).
73
See Gregory E. M aggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine,
28 C onn. L . Rev. 393 , 396 -98 (1 996 ) (describing textualism ).
74
See id . (defending Justice Scalia’s use of textualism).
75
See, e.g., Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 -45 (1992) (refusing
to read into Section 522(l) of the Bankruptcy Code a requirement of “good faith”).
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In deciding UCC cases, however, courts should not necessarily adhere
to the textualist approach exhibited in Corfan. Regardless of what judges
think of textualism in general, they should recognize that the UCC differs
from other statutes because of its peculiar relationship to the common law.
In particular, as explained below, courts often legitimately can create
common-law rules to cover the situations that the UCC does not.
a. Authority to Create and Apply New Common-Law Rules
The UCC addresses subjects that the common-law traditionally covered.
For example, the common law of sales contracts previously governed what
Article 2 now addresses.76 Similarly, the common law of bills and notes
formerly specified rules of the kind now found in Article 3.77 Before the
UCC’s enactment, judges had the primary authority for developing these
common-law rules.
*94 Passage of the UCC did not fully supplant the common-law rules in
these areas. On the contrary, with few exceptions, the drafters did not
intend the UCC to serve as exclusive legislation. The drafters ensured the
continuing existence of common-law rules by adding section 1-103, which
states:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles
of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation,
duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating
cause shall supplement its provisions.78 The UCC’s lack of exclusivity
distinguishes it from other civil codes, which at least in theory serve as the
sole body of law on a subject. In an early law review article on the UCC,
Professor Grant Gilmore explained this point. “Surely the principal
function of a Code is to abolish the past,” he said.79 “From the date of the

76
The UCC replaces the Uniform Sales Act, which previously replaced the
common law. T he co mmon law treated contra cts for the sale of go ods differently
from other contracts in several ways. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts §1.9, at
29-3 0 (2d ed. 199 0) (briefly desc ribing this history).
77
Article 3 replaces the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, which replaces
the earlier common law. See 4 William D. Hawkland & Lary Lawrence, Hawkland
Uniform Commercial C ode Series §3-1 01:0 1 (2000 ) (briefly describing this
history).
78
U.C .C. §1 -103 (2001).
79
Grant Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does for the Past, 26 LA. L. Rev. 285,
285 -86 (1 966 ).
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Code’s enactment, the pre-Code law is no longer available as a source of
law.”80 But, Professor Gilmore explained:
The Uniform Commercial Code, so-called, is not that sort of Code--even
in theory. . . . We shall do better to think of it as a big statute--or a
collection of statutes bound together in the same book--which goes as far
as it goes but no further. It assumes the continuing existence of a large
body of pre-Code and non-Code law on which it rests for support, which it
displaces to the least possible extent, and without which it could not
survive.81 Professor Gilmore believed that the common law would fill in
the gaps left by the UCC. In his words, “[t]he solid stuff of the pre-Code
law will furnish the rationale of decision quite as often as the Code’s own
gossamer substance.”82
Accordingly, if a court encounters a situation not fully covered by the
UCC, it does not have to stop like the court did in Corfan. On the contrary,
it should turn to supplementary principles of law, including common law.
If a court encounters a gap in the UCC, and no common-law rule exists to
address the issue, a court generally may create a new common-law rule.83
Although courts cannot rewrite statutes--as the court in Corfan correctly
said--they may create and apply common-law rules because the UCC
directs courts to employ supplemental general principles of law and equity.
Indeed, supplemental general principles could address each of the examples
of oversights identified above.
*95 b. What Kinds of Common-Law Rules Should Courts Create?
Saying that courts may create new common-law rules to address
oversights in the UCC’s rules only answers half the question that courts
face. The other question is exactly what common-law rules the courts
should create. Often, when a court confronts a situation not covered by the
UCC, it will have a pretty good idea of what the drafters of the UCC would
have wanted. For example, in the Corfan case discussed above, the court
and commentators both recognized that the drafters probably would have
wanted the approach of section 4A-207(a) to apply if the funds transfer
80

Id.
Id.
82
Id. at 286.
83
E.g., Girard Bank v. Mount Holly State Bank, 474 F. Supp. 1225, 1239
(D.N.J. 1979) (noting that courts may improvise new comm on-law rights to
supplement the Code). But cf. 1 Hawkland, supra note 1, § 1-103:2 (observing that
the absence of a well-defined common law often persuades courts to stay within the
Code).
81
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correctly identified the beneficiary regardless of whether the funds transfer
erroneously referred to an existing or nonexisting account. In these kinds
of cases, a court generally should create a common-law rule that accomplishes the result apparently intended but not accomplished by the UCC’s
drafters. This approach will insure the full application of whatever policy
the drafters of the UCC intended. It will also reduce the harm caused by
unintended oversights.
In some instances, courts will confront more difficult situations. For
example, suppose a court encounters a UCC section containing a general
rule and some exceptions. Suppose further that neither the general rule nor
the exceptions literally apply to the issue before the court, and the court
does not know which one should apply as a policy matter. In a situation
like this, where the court has nothing else to rely on, it probably should
apply the general rule on the theory that the drafters generally favored its
application over the exceptions.
B. The UCC Does Not Treat Special Cases Differently
Although the UCC’s provisions sometimes fail to address situations that
may arise, in other instances they have the opposite problem. The rules
occasionally do not include exceptions for special cases. Courts must
respond in a different way to this type of problem.
1. Examples
Revised Article 3 of the UCC has several sections that inadvertently
omit exceptions for special cases. One example is revised section
3-418(c),84 which attempts to codify Lord Mansfield’s famous decision in
Price v. Neal.85 Sections 3-418(a) and (b) say that a person who pays an
instrument by mistake may obtain restitution.86 Revised section 3-418(c),
*96 however, creates an exception to this rule, saying that a person paying
an instrument may not obtain restitution from a person “who in good faith
changed position in reliance on the payment.”87 This exception is too
general. It ought to say that a person paying an instrument cannot recover

84

See U.C.C. §3-418(c) (2001) (“The remedies provided by subsection (a) or
(b) [i.e., restitution] may not be asserted against a person who took the instrument
in good faith and for value or who in good faith changed position in reliance on the
payment or acceptance. This subsection d oes not limit remedies provided by
Section 3-4 17 o r 4-40 7.”).
85
3 Burr. 13 54, 9 7 Eng. Re p. 87 1 (K .B. 1762 ).
86
U.C .C. §3 -418 (a)-(b).
87
Id. § 3 -418 (c).
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in restitution to the extent that the person who has received payment has
changed position in reliance. That way, if someone received a $1000
payment, but spent only $1 in reliance, the person paying the instrument
still could recover the remaining $999.88
A similar error appears in section 3-405(b),89 which creates a special
rule for indorsements forged by an employee entrusted with responsibility
for checks, such as a corporate treasurer. The section says that if the
employee forges an indorsement, the indorsement “is effective as the
payee’s.”90 This rule also seems too broad; indorsements forged by
employees should be effective for some purposes but not others. For
instance, suppose that Llewellyn issues a check to a supplier. His trusted
employee, Gilmore, steals the check and forges the supplier’s indorsement.
Section 3-405(b) says that the indorsement is “effective” as the supplier’s
indorsement. This language carries out the drafters apparent intention of
allowing the drawee bank to pay the instrument upon its presentment and
to charge Llewellyn’s account.91 But suppose that Gilmore negotiates the
check to Mansfield instead of presenting it for payment, and that when
Mansfield presents the check, it bounces. If Gilmore’s indorsement is
“effective” as the supplier’s indorsement, then the supplier would be liable
to Mansfield.92 This result makes no sense because the supplier had no
involvement in the transaction. The drafters apparently overlooked this
possible consequence of the general rule that they stated in revised section
3-405(b).
A third example of this type of error appears in revised section 3-416(b),
which specifies the damages available for breach of transfer warranty. 93
The section says: “A person . . . may recover from the warrantor as
damages for breach of warranty an amount equal to the loss suffered as a
result of the breach, but not more than the amount of the instrument plus
expenses and loss of interest incurred as a result of the breach.” 94 The

88
Cf. Restatement of the Law of Restitution §69 (1937 ) (mak ing a change in
position on reliance either a co mple te or a partial defense, depending on the extent
of the reliance).
89
See U .C.C. § 3-405(b).
90
Id.
91
See id. §4-401(a) (permitting a bank to charge a customer’s account for an
authorized check). In the absence of the exception created by Section 3 -405 (b), if
the bank paid Llew ellyn, it could not charge Llewellyn.
92
See id . §3-4 15(a).
93
See id . §3-4 16(b).
94
Id. (em phasis add ed).
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section, unfortunately, fails to contain an exception preventing recovery*97
of avoidable damages. 95 For instance, suppose that a thief steals a
checkbook and issues a check to Gilmore, forging the drawer’s signature.
Gilmore negotiates the check for consideration to Llewellyn. Llewellyn
deposits the check in Mansfield Bank. Mansfield Bank presents the check
to the payor bank, which returns it unpaid. Although Mansfield Bank could
avoid damages simply by revoking any credit given to Llewellyn,96 it
decides to sue Gilmore for breach of warranty instead.97 Read literally,
section 3-416(b) would still allow Mansfield Bank to recover from Gilmore
the full amount of the check as damages for breach of warranty, even
though these damages could have been avoided. The drafters should have
considered this possibility. The UCC contains other examples of this type
of problem.98
2. Recommended Judicial Response
Where the drafters of the UCC inadvertently have failed to create
exceptions to general rules, courts find themselves in a difficult position.
Although judges almost always can create common-law rules to fill gaps in
the coverage of legislation,99 they generally cannot create common-law
exceptions to statutes. The principle of legislative supremacy establishes
that legislative enactments take precedence over judge-made law that might
attempt to address special cases.100

95

Cf. Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts §350 (1981) (providing that
parties generally cannot recover avoidable damages in breach of contract actions).
96
See U.C.C. §4-21 4(a) (depositary bank may revoke credit given for a check
later dishono red).
97
See id. §3-416(a)(2 ) (transferor of a check warrants that all signatures are
authen tic and authorized).
98
Sectio n 3-201(b) is another exam ple. It says: “E xcep t for negotiation by a
remitter, if an instrument is payable to an identified person, negotiation requires
transfer of possession of the instrument and its endorsement by the holder.” See id.
§3-201(b). The drafters should have ma de the exception in §3-2 01(b) broad er to
include not on ly remitters, but also transferees from remitters. See M ichaud v.
Cmty. Sav. Bank, No. CV 92-0516 0245, 19 94 W L 1463 71 (Conn. Supr. Ct. Apr.
6, 1994) (remitter transferred instrument to person who then sought to negotiate it
to the p ayee).
99
See su pra P art III.A.2.a.
100
Section 1-103 implements the principle of legislative supremacy by directing
courts to rely on supplemental general principles of law “[u]nless displaced” by
particular provisions of the UC C. See U.C.C. §1-1 03.
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For example, although a court may believe that the drafters would have
wanted an exception in section 3-416(b) for damages that could have been
avoided, it cannot establish a common-law rule having that effect. The
language of section 3-416(b) expresses the rule that courts must follow in
cases involving breach of warranty damages. Any attempt to fashion a
common-law exception would be illegitimate because it would conflict with
the text of the statute.
In many instances, however, courts may have an alternative to fashioning a common-law exception. In particular, as the following discussion will
explain, they may be able to find that the parties themselves *98 have
created an exception to the applicable rule by express or implied agreement. Within limits, this approach would not violate any principle of
legislative supremacy.
Most of the rules in the UCC merely set default terms that apply unless
the parties agree to different rules. If the parties want different rules, they
generally have the power to change them. 101 Section 1-102(3) provides:
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except
as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be
disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the
standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured
if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.102
In fact, the UCC not
only permits, but also encourages courts to allow parties to change the rules
by contract. Section 1-102(2)(b) identifies “the continued expansion of
commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties”
as one of the “[u]nderlying purposes and policies” of the UCC.103 Courts
thus should not consider private modification of UCC’s default rules as
something suspect or exceptional.
In most instances in which general rules in the UCC fail to establish
exceptions for special cases, the parties could create the exceptions by
agreement. For example, consider how the parties in theory might address
the oversight in section 3-418(c), discussed above, concerning restitution
of checks paid by mistake. Before paying a check, a bank might say to the
101

See, e.g., Greg ory E. M aggs, The Ho lder in Due Course Doc trine as a
Default Rule, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 783 , 798 -805 (1998) (discussing how parties may
create alternatives to the holder in d ue co urse doctrine applicable to negotiable
instruments).
102
See U .C.C. §1-1 02(3).
103
See id . §1-1 02(2)(b ).

PATTE RNS O F DRAFTING ERRORS IN THE U.C.C. CODE

23

person presenting the check: “Under current law, if it later turns out that we
have paid this check by mistake, we may recover only if you have not relied
on the payment. But we think this rule contains a drafting error.” The bank
then might ask the person presenting the check: “Would you agree to
change the default rule, allowing us to recover not only if you have not
relied at all, but also to the extent that you have not relied?” If the person
presenting the check agreed, then a court could enforce their modification
of the existing default rule.104
Experience suggests that parties to commercial transactions rarely, if
ever, will make this kind of agreement explicitly. They usually do not say
anything about the rules in the UCC and the exceptions that the drafters
may have forgotten to include. In fact, most people do not *99 present
checks directly to the payor bank but instead deposit them, allowing the
depositary bank or an intermediary bank to present them.
Nothing in section 1-103(2), however, suggests that parties may change
the default rules only by express agreement. Accordingly, courts should
consider whether the facts of the particular transaction suggest that the
parties implicitly agreed to create an exception. Even if the parties do not
say anything, their past course of dealing and the usage of the trade may
show an agreement. Section 1-205(3) says: “A course of dealing between
the parties and any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are
engaged or of which they are or should be aware give particular meaning
to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement.”105 Pursuant to this
provision, courts may consider evidence of the parties’ previous conduct
and the prevailing business customs.
Consider the following example. Suppose that Mansfield wants to buy
a car from Llewellyn. Worried that a personal check from Mansfield may
bounce, Llewellyn tells Mansfield to pay for the car with a cashier’s check.
Mansfield buys a cashier’s check payable to Llewellyn and transfers it to
Llewellyn in exchange for the car.
When Mansfield transferred the check to Llewellyn, he made a variety
of implied warranties. Under section 3-416(a)(1), he warranted that he was
a person entitled to enforce the instrument.106 Most courts, however, take

104

Lack of consideration under the preexisting duty rule is not an issue because
the drawee of a check ha s no duty to pay the holder. See id. §3-408 (“the drawee
is not liable on the instrume nt until the drawee accepts it”).
105
Id. §1 -205 (3).
106
See U .C.C. §3-4 16(a)(1) (1990).
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the position that remitters107 --like Mansfield--are not entitled to enforce
instruments. 108 If that is correct, then the drafters should have created an
exception in section 3-416(a)(1) for remitters, because otherwise remitters
always will breach the transfer warranty when they use an instrument to
buy something. Although Mansfield probably would not suffer any easily
calculated damages because of this breach of warranty, if he wanted to get
out of the sale, he theoretically might be able to assert the breach of
warranty as a basis for rescinding the transaction.
A court cannot create a common-law exception to section 3-416(a)
because of the principle of legislative supremacy. A court, however, easily
could find an implicit agreement preventing Llewellyn from canceling the
contract based on the breach of warranty in section 3-416(a)(1).109
Llewellyn surely did not desire the warranty from Mansfield; merchants
take cashier’s checks from customers precisely because they do not want
*100 to have to enforce the checks against them. Llewellyn, moreover,
expressly instructed Mansfield on how to structure the transaction.
Some courts may hesitate to use the approach of finding exceptions
based on implied agreements because they may see it as a trick designed to
thwart the principle of legislative supremacy. They may think that finding
an implicit agreement not to follow a rule in the UCC effectively creates a
judicial exception to a statute. If carried far enough, the approach could
justify ignoring the UCC altogether.
This concern warrants two responses. First, as noted immediately
above, the UCC expressly recognizes that parties may alter its rules by
agreement and that course of dealing and usage of trade may create implied
agreements. The principle of legislative supremacy also requires courts to
follow these aspects of the UCC. Courts thus must consider the possibility
that parties have created exceptions to the UCC’s rules by contract.
107

A remitter is a “person who purchases an instrument from its issuer if the
instrument is payable to an identified person other than the purchaser.” Id.
§3-1 03(a)(11).
108
See, e.g., Perrino v. S alem, Inc., 243 B.R. 550, 557 (D. Me. 1999) (remitter
not entitled to enforce); see also Gregory E. Maggs, Determining the Rights and
Liabilities of the Remitter of a Negotiable Instrument: A Theory Applied to Some
Unsettled Questions, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 619, 639-50 (19 95) (discussing this issue and
arguing that pe rhaps remitters should have the right to enforce).
109
The implicit agreement would be that breach of warranty would not justify
canceling the contract. Concluding that Mansfield never mad e the wa rranty would
be more difficult because §3 -417 (e) says that the imp lied warranties “cannot be
disclaimed with respect to checks.”
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Second, the suggested approach in fact does have limits. A court must
consider the actual circumstances of the particular transaction at issue
before concluding the parties have made an implicit agreement. A court
could not hold, for example, that a person presenting a check for payment
always implicitly agrees to allow restitution to the extent that the person
has not relied on the payment. A per se rule like that would violate
legislative supremacy because it would negate part of section 3-418(c)’s
text.
This last point leads to the question of when courts should find that
parties have made implicit agreements creating exceptions in improperly
drafted provisions of the UCC. This question has no easy answer.
Certainly, the party seeking the exception will have the burden of raising
the issue and proving the facts showing the agreement. At a minimum,
though, courts should keep the possibility of implied agreements in mind
before applying a rule to an exceptional case that the drafters apparently
overlooked.
C. The UCC Uses Undefined Ambiguous Terms
The drafters of the UCC decided to use a large number of special terms
when writing its various provisions. They defined many of these special
terms in different places throughout the code. Section 1-201, for instance,
specifies the meanings of forty-six words and phrases used in all of the
articles. 110 Articles 2 through 9 also includes additional definitions that
apply to their specific rules.111 Unfortunately, in some instances, the
drafters failed to define key terms. This oversight, needless to say, can
make the UCC difficult to interpret.
*101 1. Examples
Two simple but important examples of undefined terms appear in a
central provision of Article 2, which governs contracts for the sale of
goods. Section 2-105(1) says that goods includes “things” that are
“movable” at the time of identification to the contract.112 Nothing in the
UCC, however, defines the words “things” or “movable.” These terms may
be sufficiently clear to exclude certain subjects, like services113 (which are

110

See U .C.C. §1-2 01 (200 1).
See, e.g., id. §§4A-103 to 4A-105; id. §5-102.
112
See id . §2-1 05(1).
113
See J.O. Hooker & Sons, Inc. v. Roberts Cabinet Co., Inc., 683 So. 2d 396,
400 (M iss. 199 6) (stating services are not go ods).
111
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not things) and real estate114 (which is not movable). Providing definitions
of these terms, however, might have helped to resolve ambiguity about their
application to other items, like electricity115 or computer software.116
Another example of an undefined term appears in the revised version of
Article 3 on negotiable instruments. Revised Article 3 uses the term
“payee” in ten sections but does not define it.117 One recurring issue is
whether the term payee refers only to the person to whom the instrument
is initially payable or whether it also can refer to someone to whom the
instrument is made payable by special indorsement.118
2. Recommended Judicial Response
By tradition, when courts come across an undefined term in a statute,
they take it upon themselves to assign a meaning. 119 They may choose to

114

See W hite v. Peabody Co nstr. Co., Inc., 434 N.E.2 d 1015, 10 21-22 (Ma ss.
198 2) (stating real estate is not a goo d).
115
Compare Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Goebel, 28 Ohio Misc. 2d 4 (1986)
(holding electricity is a good), with New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. v. Boston
Edison Co., 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (DBC) 397 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding
electricity is not a go od).
116
See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d C ir. 1991) (stating
a comp uter program is a good if subsumed in a tangible medium like a computer
disk).
117
See U.C.C. §§3-106(d), -109(a)(2), -110(a) & (b), - 116(a), -305(a)(3),
-307 (b)(4 ), -312 (a)(3) & (b ), -404 (a)-(c), - 405(a), -420(a) (2001).
118
The rule with respect to fictitious payees provides an example. Section
3-404(b) says: “If... the pe rson id entified as payee of an instrume nt is a fictitious
perso n,... [a]n indorsement by any person in the name of the payee ... is effective...
in favor of a person who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value or
for collection.” Id . §3-4 04(b). Accordingly, if Llewellyn m akes a check paya ble to
Karl Gilmore, a fictitious person, then anyone can indorse the check in Karl
Gilmore’s name. But suppose Llewellyn makes a check payable to Mansfield, who
in turn makes it payable to Karl Gilmore by special indorsement. Is Karl Gilmore
the “payee” within the meaning of section3-404(b)?
119
There are excep tions. For example, a court may determine that undefined
terms in a statute regulating speech cause vague ness that violates the First
Amendm ent and therefore the court may invalidate the statute instead of interpreting
it. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU , 521 U.S. 844 , 870-79 (199 7) (striking down the
Comm unications Decency Act in part because of its use of vague undefined terms).
This exception does not ap pear to apply to an y provision o f the UCC.
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follow the ordinary usage of the term in standard English.120 *102 Or they
may pick some specialized meaning, based on context, legislative history,
or some other factor. 121 They do not simply refuse to address the issue.
The same general principle holds true in UCC cases. Courts must assign
meanings to undefined words and phrases, like “thing” or “movable” or
“payee.” The UCC, however, differs from other statutes in two respects.
First, as noted above, section 1-103 specifically directs courts to refer to
supplemental general principles of law when applying its provisions.122
Courts therefore must look to the common law and other statutes for
guidance in interpreting undefined phrases in the UCC.
The term “consideration” illustrates this idea. Section 2-205 specifies
an instance in which a promise to keep an offer open does not require
“consideration.”123 Section 2-209(1), in addition, says that modifications
to contracts for the sale of goods do not require “consideration” to be

120

See A sgrow Seed Co. v. W interbo er, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) ( “When
terms used in a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.”); FDIC
v. M eyer, 510 U .S. 47 1, 47 6 (1994 ) (stating sim ilar idea).
121
See D ole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (indicating
that word s grouped together should have a related meaning); Massachusetts v.
Mo rash, 490 U.S. 107, 11 4-15 (1989 ) (stating similar idea); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987) (“[I]n expounding a statute, we [are] not... guided
by a single sentence or memb er of a se ntence , but loo k to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its obje ct and policy.”). Sometimes und efined terms have a plain
meaning in ordinary usage, but appear to have a different meaning in the context of
the UCC , suggesting that the drafters intended a special definition. The word
“nonconforming” in U.C.C. §2-206(1)(b) provides an example. Section 2-206(1)
says that a seller accepts a buyer’s offer by shipping “non-conforming goods.”
U.C.C. §2-206(1)(b) (2001). This section is designed to prevent sellers from using
the so-called unilateral co ntract trick of arguing that they are not liable for
nonconformities in their shipments because they never promised to ship conforming
good s. See 1 Hawkland, supra note 1, §2-20 6:3. Bu t suppose a buyer ord ers boo ks,
would a shipment of tomatoes count as “nonconforming” goods? Certainly tomatoes
are not bo oks, but a nonconform ity of this magnitude suggests that the seller
actually may not have been attempting to accept, and therefore the goal of
preventing the unilateral contract trick would not be served by finding a contract.
The problem, as Professor Williston noted, is that nothing in the section explains
how great the nonconformity might be. See Samuel Williston, The Law of Sales in
the Proposed Unifo rm Comm ercial C ode , 63 H arv. L. R ev. 56 1, 57 7 (1950 ).
122
See su pra P art III.A.2.a.
123
U.C .C.§2 -205 (b).
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binding.124 Although Article 2 does not define “consideration,”125 this
omission does not prevent courts from applying these sections. Under
section 1-103, courts should follow the common-law definition.126
Second, when the common law does not supply a clear answer, the UCC
gives courts another important directive concerning its interpretation. In
particular, section 1-102(1) mandates: “This Act shall be liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes . . . .”127 Section
1-102(2) then states:
*103 Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are (a) to simplify,
clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (b) to
permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom,
usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among
128
the various jurisdictions.
When courts confront undefined terms, which
have no specific common-law meaning, they should use these factors to
choose an appropriate definition. Factor (c) probably has the most
importance;129 it implies that courts generally should follow precedent
from other jurisdictions when selecting the meaning of undefined terms. A
court in California thus should adopt the meaning given by a court in New
York to a term like “payee,”130 unless it considers the decision plainly

124

Id. §2 -209 (1).
The U CC defines the term “consideration” as used in Article 3 to mean “any
consideration sufficien t to supp ort a sim ple co ntract.” Id. §3 -303 (b).
126
The common-law definition of consideration may vary from state to state.
Most states, however, now subscribe to the so-called bargain theory. See E. Allan
Farnsworth, Contracts § 2.2 (2 d ed. 199 0).
127
U.C .C. §1 -102 (1).
128
Id. §1 -102 (2).
129
Although factors (a) and (b) provide some guidance, few courts would want
to complicate the law or inhibit commercial development even if such factors were
expressly stated in §1-1 02(2).
130
See ABM Escrow Closing & Consulting, Inc. v. Matanuska Maid, Inc., 659
P.2d 1170, 11 72 (Alaska 1983 ) (“Although precedent from other jurisdictions is,
of course, not binding upon us, we nonetheless are mindful of the fact that a basic
objective of the U niform Commercial C ode is to pro mote national uniformity in the
commercial arena and that this objective w ould be underm ined should we decline
to follow the stated intent of the Code ’s drafters and the reasoned decisions o f a
number of other jurisdictions.”); In re Fed. W holesale M eats & Froz en Fo ods, Inc.,
168 N.W.2d 70, 73 (W is. 1969) (“[S]imilar judicial construction of identical
provisions in the uniform code serve the purpose of the legislation: uniformity.”).
125
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wrong. 131 The UCC makes uniformity a priority because parties often must
plan transactions that involve the laws of more than one state. Conflicting
interpretations destroy the intended uniformity of the statute and are
difficult to correct. Although the NCCUSL does propose amendments to
the UCC from time to time,132 the great burden of persuading each
jurisdiction in the United States to adopt the amendments prevents
NCCUSL from devising amendments that will correct every conflict that
arises.
D. The UCC Uses Circular Definitions or Cross-References
The UCC relies heavily on definitions and cross-references. Applying
one section often requires looking up terms and rules in several other
sections.133 In general, cross-references have the advantage of promoting
consistency throughout the statute. When the drafters have acted with great
care, all of the various provisions fit together. Unfortunately, in *104 some
instances, the cross-references seem to have gotten out of hand. Instead of
providing answers, they merely lead in circles.134
1. Examples
Section 1-201(9) contains perhaps the simplest example of circularity.
The provision vaguely defines a “buyer in the ordinary course” as “a person
who . . . buys in the ordinary course . . . .”135 A similar example of
circularity appears in the pre-2001 version of Article 9’s provision on the

131

See Ditch W itch Trenching Co . of Ky., Inc. v. C & S Carpentry Servs., Inc.,
812 S.W .2d 1 71, 1 72 (Ky. A pp. 1 991 ) (stating that despite com mentators’
recommendation that courts “follow the majority rule,” it is “more impo rtant... to
reach a correct result than mechanically adopt the majority position.”); 1 Hawkland,
supra note 1, §1-102:8 (arguing that while courts should not follow decisions from
other jurisdictions that they consider wrong, they should follow decisions that they
consider right even if they are no t the “best” possible interpretations).
132
See su pra P art II.B .
133
The official comments to Article 2 list cross-references for each section. See,
e.g., U.C .C. §2 -611 cmt. (2001 ) (listing cro ss references to §§2 -609 , 1-20 1, and
2-10 6).
134
The term “circular,” in the field of logic, describes “reasoning that uses in the
argument or proof a conclusion to be proved or one of its unp roved consequences.”
Merriam -W ebster’s Collegiate Dictionary 207 (10th ed. 199 3). In legislation, the
circularity does not involve reasoning, but instead the ex pression of legal rules.
Statutory sections are circ ular if they state legal rules by referring in whole o r in
part to the legal rules that they are see king to e xpress.
135
See Al Maroone Ford, Inc. v. Manheim Auto Auction, Inc., 208 A.2d 290,
292 (Pa. Super. 19 65) (noting this circularity).
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perfection of security interests. Section 9-303(1) states: “A security interest
is perfected when it has attached and when all of the applicable steps
required for perfection have been taken.”136 Section 9-303(1) is circular
because determining whether “all of the applicable steps” have occurred
requires looking at section 9-303(1).137
Revised Article 3 contains another example of circularity in one of its
most fundamental provisions. In an effort to make the Article clearer, the
drafters made a list in revised section 3-301 of the persons entitled to
enforce negotiable instruments.138 The first two types of people listed are
(i) holders and (ii) nonholders in possession with the rights of holders.139
The problem with this section is that to determine whether a nonholder has
“the rights of holder,” it is necessary to determine whether the nonholder
is entitled to enforce because the right to enforce is one of the rights of a
holder. Yet, the only section that answers that question is section 3-301
itself.140 Other sections in the UCC contain additional examples of
circularity.141
*105 2. Recommended Judicial Response
When confronted with problems of circularity in the UCC, courts should
recognize that circular provisions effectively have no meaning. To the
136

U.C .C. §9 -303 (a) (1999 ).
See In re Long Chevrolet, Inc., 79 B.R. 759 , 766 (N.D . Ill. 1987) (no ting this
ambiguity); see also David G ray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization,
39 W m. & Mary L. Rev. 1055, 1085 n.185 (1998) (noting similar problem of
circularity in UC C §9-30 1).
138
See U .C.C. §3-3 01 (200 1).
139
See id . §3-3 01(i)-(ii).
140
For example, suppose B ritton purchases a cashier’s check from a bank,
making it payab le to Mansfield. In this situation, Britton is a remitter. See id.
§3-103(a)(11 ). Can Britton enforce the cashier’s check if he decides not to negotiate
it to Mansfield? Under Section 3-301(i) an d (ii), he could enforce if he were a
“holder” or a “non-holder in possession with the rights of a holder.” Britton is a not
a holder because the instrument is payable to Mansfield. So the question arises
whether he is a non-holder in possession with the rights of a holder. Here the
problem of circularity arises. T o answer the question of whether B ritton, as a
remitter, has the rights of a ho lder, a court ne eds to consider what the rights of a
holder are. One right of a holder--perhaps the most important--is the right to enforce
the instrument. Accordingly, Section 3-301 effectively says that (1) a remitter can
enforce if the remitter has the rights of holder; and (2) a remitter has the rights of
holder only if the remitter can en force.
141
See, e.g., id. §2-501(1)(a) (“identification” of goods occurs when the contract
is mad e if the goods are “identified” ).
137
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extent that section 1-203(9) defines a buyer in the ordinary course as a
person who buys in the ordinary course, the provision really is not saying
anything. Because circular provisions have no meaning, they leave gaps in
the UCC’s rules.
Courts generally can fill gaps in the UCC by applying existing
common-law rules or by creating new common-law rules which become
applicable as supplemental general principles.142 Nothing prevents courts
from extending this practice to gaps created by the circular definitions or
cross-references. As an illustration, consider again the example of section
3-301. If confronted with the issue of whether a particular nonholder can
enforce negotiable instruments, a court should conclude that section 3-301
simply provides no answer. Although it purports to list the persons who can
enforce a negotiable instrument, it has no meaning with respect to
nonholders. A court thus must decide the issue using an existing or a new
common-law rule.
E. The UCC Uses Words and Phrases Inconsistently
Another statutory drafting problem that complicates interpretation is
that the UCC sometimes appears to use specialized terminology in
inconsistent ways.
1. Examples
One example of an inconsistent use of terms concerns variations of the
word “obligate.” In general, when the UCC says a person is “obligated” or
has an “obligation,” it means that the person has a duty to make a payment
or render another performance. For instance, a person obligated on a note
has a duty to pay it.143 Section 9-102(a)(3), however, uses the term in a
different way when it defines “account debtor” to mean “the person who is
obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible.”144 As a
leading UCC treatise points out, the owner of a general intangible subject
to a security interest may have no duty to pay money or do anything else.145

142

See su pra P art I.A.
See U .C.C. §3-4 12.
144
Id. §9 -105 (1).
145
8 Hawkland, sup ra note 1, §9 -105 :2.
143

If the general intangible is in the nature of a patent, trademark or copyright
and the collateral is the right to receive royalties under the intangible,
presu mab ly the account deb tor is the entity obliga ted to pay the royalty.
W ith other types of intangibles, however, such as goodwill or a stock
exchange seat, the term account debtor seems to have little or no meaning.
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The treatise conjectures that the drafters *106 “were so intent upon making
the term general intangibles sufficiently broad to cover every situation that
they could not ensure a perfect fit with other definitions.”146
Another example of inconsistent usage concerns the term “accepted
check.” Revised section 3-409(a) defines acceptance as the drawee’s signed
agreement to pay a draft.147 Under this definition, a certified check is an
accepted check, 148 but what is a cashier’s check? 149 A cashier’s check
would appear to be an accepted check because the drawee is the same bank
as the drawer, and as the drawer, the bank signs the check.150 Yet, the UCC
distinguishes
certified checks from cashier’s checks in various provisions.
151
A third possible example of inconsistent usage concerns the term
“forged” in revised Article 3. In general, a person forges a signature by
creating a counterfeit signature and passing it off as genuine.152 In section
3-406(a), however, the drafters apparently intended the term to apply to
other kinds of signatures.153 An official comment to section 3-406(a)
contains this hypothetical example:
An insurance company draws a check to the order of Sarah Smith in
payment of a claim of a policyholder, Sarah Smith, who lives in Alabama.
The insurance company also has a policyholder with the same name who
lives in Illinois. By mistake, the insurance company mails the check to the
Illinois Sarah Smith who indorses the check and obtains payment. Because
the payee of the check is the Alabama Sarah Smith, the endorsement by the

Id.

146

Id.
See U .C.C. §3-4 09(a).
148
See id . §3-4 09(d).
149
See id. §3 -104(g) (“’C ashier’s check’ means a draft with respect to which the
draw er and drawee are the sam e ban k or b ranches of the same bank.”).
150
See id .
151
See, e.g., id. §§3-31 0(a), -312 (a)(1).
152
See, e.g., id. §3-405(b) (addressing such forgeries by employees entrusted
with resp onsibility).
153
See id. §3-406(a)
147

A person whose failure to exercise ordinary care substantially contributes
to an alteration of an instrument or to the making of a forged signature on
an instrument is precluded from asserting the alteration or the forgery
against a person who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value
or for collection.
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Illinois Sarah Smith is a forged endorsement.154 A s P r o f e s s o r A d a
Long-Croom has pointed out, if the comment reflects what the drafters
intended, then the drafters did not use the term “forged” in section 3-406(a)
as they did elsewhere.155 Sarah Smith’s signature was not a forgery as the
term generally is used because the signature*107 genuinely was hers. The
signature was not counterfeit, and it may be difficult to conclude that she
passed it off as anyone else’s signature.156
2. Recommended Judicial Response
As with the other problems discussed in this article, more careful
drafting could eliminate the difficulties posed by inconsistent usage of
terminology. For example, the drafters in section 3-406(a) should not have
used the term “forged.” Instead, they should have said something like: “A
person whose failure to exercise ordinary care substantially contributes to
the payment of an instrument to an unintended person is precluded from
challenging the payment as unauthorized.”157 Courts, however, do not have
the luxury of rewriting statutes to eliminate inconsistent usages, but must
interpret the language enacted by the legislature.
The UCC’s special characteristics again may simplify the interpretative
task before the courts. Suppose that a court is confronted with two UCC
sections, A and B, both of which use the undefined term X. If X is
susceptible to more than one meaning, a court must decide what meaning
to give to X. The court also must decide whether the X should have the
same meaning in both sections A and B.

154

Id. §3 -406 cmt. 3, illus. 3 (emphasis add ed).
See Ada Long-Croom, What You See Is What You Get--Or Is it? Permitting
the Issuer’s Subjective Intent to D etermine the Payee’s Identity on a Negotiab le
Instrum ent, 41 Ho w. L.J. 1 25, 1 33 (199 7).
156
W hether the term “forged signature” includes signatures of this type makes
a difference. If Sarah Smith’s signature is a “forged signature,” then Section
3-406(a) would allow the drawee to charge the insurance company’s account
because the company’s negligence substantially contributed to the making o f a
forged signature. See U .C.C. §3-4 06(a). But if it is not a forged signature, then it
is merely an additio nal indorsement by a person other than the payee. The bank
could not charge the insurance company’s account because it lacks the signature of
the intended Sarah S mith. See id . §4-401(a) (permitting a bank to charge a
customer’s account for an autho rized check).
157
Cf. id. §4-40 1(a) (defining pro per p ayment).
155
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When interpreting statutes other than the UCC, most courts would strive
for consistency in interpreting the two sections.158 They would assume that
the term X should have the same meaning in both section A and section B.
Accordingly, they would look for a meaning that appears to make the most
sense for X in both contexts, and then apply it uniformly. This traditional
desire for consistency, however, can lead to problems. The best meaning
for X in section A might produce an undesired result in section B, or vice
versa. If the court seeks consistency, then it may have to pick a meaning
that is less than ideal for one section or the other (or possibly both).
As an alternative, a court might simply say that X has one meaning for
section A, and another meaning for section B. For instance, to refer to the
example discussed above, the court might conclude that the term “forged”
has a different meaning in section 3-406(a) from the meaning that it has in
other provisions. In particular, the court could say that in section 3-406(a),
the term covers situations in which a person signs his or *108 her own
name but causes another to pay the instrument by mistake. This approach
limits the harm caused by choosing one meaning for a term, and then
applying the term consistently throughout the UCC. The approach allows
courts to follow the drafters’ intentions for each section.
Holding that a single term has different meanings when used in different
sections of the same statute may strike some courts as confusing at best,
and illegitimate at worst. Three factors, however, reduce this concern in
the context of the UCC. First, as noted above, if a term in the UCC does
not have a definition, a court may supply one.159 Any definition added
becomes applicable as a supplemental general principle of law. 160 Nothing
prevents courts from adding varying definitions. Second, the UCC is a
generally well-drafted statute. Although it contains inconsistencies in some
instances, it generally uses words and phrases in a coherent manner. Thus,
this approach would affect only a small number of cases. Third, because the
UCC was never intended to serve as an exclusive body of law, 161 judges
and lawyers who want to know what it means can never simply read it.
Regardless of its apparent clarity, they must look to the common law and
other statutes for supplemental general principles. Consequently, having

158

See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 , 568 (1995 ) (citing the
canon of statutory constru ction requiring courts to give a term a “consistent
meaning thro ugho ut the Act.”).
159
See su pra P art III.C.
160
See U .C.C. §1-1 03.
161
See su pra P art III.A.2.a.
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case law that specifies the meanings of a term for different sections would
not impose substantial additional burdens.
This approach also comports with the apparent intentions of the drafters
not to create a comprehensive code, but instead only to implement a
number of separate rules for improving the common law. For example,
Article 2 contains a number of sections that make minor changes to the
common law of contracts that could have been enacted independently from
the rest of the UCC. 162 As Grant Gilmore stated, “[w]e shall do better to
think of [the UCC] as . . . a collection[] of statutes bound together in the
same book . . . .”163 Similarly, courts might treat sections containing
inconsistent terminology much like separate statutes, and not worry about
trying to make them consistent.
F. The UCC Does Not Indicate Which Rule Should Apply If the Elements
of a Provision Are Not Satisfied
Many statutory provisions in the UCC are stated in a conditional form.
In other words, they specify rules that apply only under certain circumstances. 164 For example, section 5-108(a) requires a bank to pay a *109
letter of credit, but only upon the agreed documentary presentation.165
Similarly, a bank must honor a stop payment order, but only if the bank
receives the order in circumstances allowing it a reasonable time to act.166
Experience suggests that to avoid confusion, when legislation includes
conditional rules, it should state clearly not only what happens when the
conditions occur, but also what should happen if they do not. Federal Rule
of Evidence 402 is a good example. It contains two sentences, the first of
which says that evidence is admissible if it is relevant and no exceptions
apply: “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules,
or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority.”167 The second sentence then gives the rule that applies if
evidence is not relevant: “Evidence which is not relevant is not admissi-
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See, e.g., U.C.C. §2-209(1) (eliminating the common -law requirement of
considerations for promises to mod ify prior agreem ents).
163
Gilmore, supra note 79, at 28 5-86 .
164
The existence of conditions in the UC C is by no means unique. Most statutes
contain rules that take effect only upon the satisfaction of certain elements.
165
See U .C.C. §5-1 08(a).
166
See id . §4A -406 (b).
167
Fed. R. Ev id. 40 2.
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ble.”168 The UCC, by contrast, often states rules that apply when certain
conditions are met, but then does not state what rule applies when the
conditions are not met. In some instances, this shortcoming may lead to
confusion.
1. Examples
A simple example of this difficulty appears in one of Article 4’s central
provisions. Section 4-401(a) says that the bank may charge a customer’s
checking account if it pays a check that is properly payable (meaning
authorized by the drawer).169 Section 4-401(a), however, does not state the
rights or liabilities of a bank in connection with a check that is not properly
payable. For example, suppose Mansfield issues a check payable to
Llewellyn. If Mansfield’s bank pays Llewellyn, it may charge Mansfield’s
account. But suppose instead that Gilmore steals Mansfield’s checkbook
and forges Mansfield signature as the drawer. If Mansfield’s bank pays the
forged check, may it charge Mansfield’s account for the check? Oddly,
nothing in Article 4 expressly prohibits a bank from charging a customer’s
account for a check which is not properly payable. section 4-401(a) says
when a bank may charge a customer’s account, but not when the bank may
not. In section 4-401(a), the drafters of the UCC should have followed the
lead of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence. They should have
stated that a bank may charge a customer’s account for a check that is
properly payable, and then said that a bank may not charge a customer’s
account for a check that is not properly payable.
*110 2. Recommended Judicial Response
The UCC fortunately affords courts an uncontroversial approach to
addressing this problem. Section 1-103, 170 as noted above,171 allows courts
to supplement the UCC’s provisions with common-law principles.
Generally, whenever the UCC does not indicate what rule should apply if
its conditions are not satisfied, a court simply can find or create a common-law rule to address the situation. For instance, in the hypothetical
involving Mansfield’s stolen check, a court could look to the ordinary
common-law rules on the discharge of debts to determine Mansfield’s
rights. In general, a debtor cannot discharge any portion of a debt through
payment to a person other than the creditor, unless the creditor directs the
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Id.
See U.C.C. §4-40 1(a).
170
See id . §1-1 03.
171
See su pra P art III.A.2.
169
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debtor to make the payment. 172 This common-law rule would prevent the
bank from charging a customer’s account, even though section 4-401(a)
does not state this rule.
G. The UCC Uses Referents with Unclear Antecedents
The English language permits writers to compose sentences with
multiple phrases and clauses. Unfortunately, when one portion of a
sentence refers to another, ambiguity may result. Consider for example the
following sentence: “Price saw Neal on his way to the Bank of England.”
This sentence leaves ambiguous whether it was Price or Neal who was
going to the bank.
This kind of ambiguity also can arise in statutes. As a general rule, the
more complicated the subject matter of legislation, the longer and more
complex the sentences used to state the applicable rules. As length and
complexity increase, so too does the probability that ambiguous references
will occur. It thus should come as no surprise that the UCC contains many
ambiguous references.
1. Examples
A simple example of the problem of ambiguous references appears in
section 2-107(2). The first sentence of this provision says: “A contract for
the sale apart from land of growing crops or other things attached to realty
and capable of severance without material harm thereto but not described
in subsection (1) or of timber to be cut is a contract for the sale of goods
within this Article . . . .”173 Suppose that a seller enters a contract to sever
a water heater from a house and sell it. Is this contract*111 a contract for
the sale of goods within the scope of Article 2? The water heater is a “thing
[] attached to realty and capable of severance.”174 But the phrase “without

172

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §278 cmt. (1981) (“If the oblig or
offers a performance that differs from what is due in full or partial satisfaction of
his duty the oblige e need not accept it.”).
173
U.C .C. §2 -107 (2) (emph asis added ).
174
Id. If the water heater were not attached to the realty, it would be a good as
a movable thing under §2-105(1). See Worrell v. Barnes, 484 P.2d 573, 576 (N ev.
197 1) (no ting water heater to be installed is a good).
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material harm thereto” creates an ambiguity;175 it is unclear whether it
refers to the realty or the thing to be severed.176
The revised version of Article 3 contains another example of an
ambiguous reference in its central provision creating the holder in due
course doctrine. Section 3-305(a) says that the right to enforce an
instrument is subject to: (1) real contract defenses (such as illegality,
infancy, or discharge in bankruptcy); (2) ordinary contract defenses (such
as lack of consideration or discharge by payment); and (3) claims in
recoupment. 177 Section 3-305(b) then states a special rule with respect to
holders in due course:
(b) The right of a holder in due course to enforce the obligation of a
party to pay the instrument is subject to defenses of the obligor stated in
subsection (a)(1), but is not subject to defenses of the obligor stated in
subsection (a)(2) or claims in recoupment stated in subsection (a)(3) against
a person other than the holder.178 The ambiguity is whether the phrase
“against a person other than the holder” refers to both the defenses stated
in (a)(2) and claims in recoupment stated in (a)(3), or instead whether the
phrase refers just to the claims in recoupment stated in (a)(3). This
ambiguity complicates the resolution of cases involving payees who have

175

In fact, this section contains additional ambiguities. One is whether the
“material harm thereto” phrase ap plies only to “other things attac hed to realty” or
instead whethe r it also ap plies to “growing crops.” Another is whether the phrase
“not described in subsection (1)” excludes all structures or only structures severed
by the buyer bec ause subsec tion (1) defines structures severed by the seller as
goo ds.
176
The drafters of the revised version of Article 2 have b een working on this
problem. Their July 1999 draft replaced the word “thereto” with “to the real
property.” See Uniform Law Commissioners: National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proposed Revisions of Uniform Commercial Code
Article 2--Sales, at http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/ucc299 am.htm (last
visited Sept. 4, 2001) (July 1999 Annual Meeting Draft). This progress, however,
has not lasted. T he July 2000 d raft has restored the word “thereto,” recreating the
ambiguity. See Uniform Law Comm issioners: National Conference of Comm issioners on Uniform State Laws, Proposed Revisions of Uniform Commercial Code
Article 2--Sales, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm (last visited
Sep t. 4, 2001) (July 20 00 A nnual Meeting D raft).
177
See U .C.C. §3-3 05(a)(1)-(3) (2 001 ).
178
Id. §3 -305 (b).
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the status of a holder in due course.179 As one of the leading commercial
law casebooks states the issue: “If the ‘against’ clause at the end of the
section applies to defenses*112 as well as recoupment, the implication is
that even if the payee is a holder in due course that person cannot take free
of the defenses that a maker or drawer has against the payee-holder.” 180
The casebook, however, points out that “nowhere do the voluminous
comments to §§ 3-302 and 3-305 refer to the ‘against’ clause as applying
in any case but recoupment.”181
2. Recommended Judicial Responses
In many ways, the problem of ambiguous references resembles the
problem of undefined terms and the problem of circularity discussed
above.182 In all three cases, the UCC has stated rules, but the rules are not
sufficiently clear to apply as written. As explained above, when confronted
with missing definitions or circularity, courts may supply a common-law
rule pursuant to the UCC’s direction that they consider supplemental
general principles of law.183 The courts may assume that the drafters of the
legislation wanted undefined terms to have common-law definitions or that
common-law principles would specify a rule where a group of selfreferential statutory provisions did not.
Ambiguous references, however, create a more difficult problem than
missing definitions or circular reasoning. When confronted with ambiguous references, a court cannot simply retreat to the common law as though
the UCC were silent. The term must refer to something in the statute, and
the court must identify it. In deciding cases presenting this type of
problem, courts first should consider whether--as a policy matter--the
phrase in question ought to refer to both of the possible referents. For
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For e xample, sup pose that a seller sells goods to a buyer on credit. The buyer
then fraudulently induces a friend to pay the seller by check. Suppose further the
seller qualifies as a holder in due course because the seller takes the check in good
faith, for value (i.e., discharge of the debt), and without no tice of any defense (i.e.,
the defense of fraud). May the seller enforce the check against the friend or may the
friend assert the defense of fraudulent inducement? Although the buyer engaged in
the fraud, could this defense be asserted against the seller? The answer turns on
whether the final clause refers to both de fenses and claims in recoup ment, or just
the latter.
180
Robert L. Jordan et al., Negotiab le Instrum ents, Payments and C redits 7 0 (5th
ed. 2000 ).
181
Id. at 70-71 .
182
See su pra P arts III.C .2., III.D .2.
183
See id .
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example, in construing section 2-107(2), a court first might consider
whether the word “thereto” should refer to both the realty and to the thing
attached. Similarly, in interpreting section 3-305(b), a court might consider
whether the phrase “against a person other than the holder” should modify
both defenses and claims in recoupment.
If the court thinks as a policy matter that the phrase should refer to both
of the possible referents, it generally should conclude that it does. This
decision will not run afoul of the statutory language. The drafters must
have intended the phrase to refer to at least one of the referents. Through
its ability to supplement the UCC with common-law rules, the court
generally may hold that the phrase also applies to the other.184 By contrast,
if courts see evidence that the drafters wanted to include only *113 one of
the grammatically possible referents, then they should not create a
common-law rule to include the other.185
H. The UCC Contains Rules That Conflict with Each Other
Although the drafters of the UCC attempted to make all of its rules
consistent, they did not succeed on a few occasions. Sometimes, two or
more provisions in the UCC conflict with each other. Courts, accordingly,
cannot apply each of the rules as written.
1. Examples
A well-known example of a conflict appears in Article 2. Suppose that
the seller of goods repudiates a contract with a buyer. Section 2-610(a)
permits the buyer to wait for a reasonable time before resorting to any
remedies. 186 During this period, the buyer may attempt to persuade the
seller to retract the repudiation. 187 Section 2-713(1), however, conflicts
with section 2-610(a).188 It addresses situations in which the buyer seeks
damages for the seller’s breach based on the difference between the
contract price and the market price.189 Section 2-713(1) requires a court to
measure the difference in prices at the time “the buyer learned of the
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See U .C.C. §1-1 03 (200 1).
For example, in Section 2-10 7(2), the term “thereto ” pro bab ly refers only to
the realty. Buyers rarely would want to purchase a thing attached to realty if
detachment would cause material harm to the thing.
186
See U .C.C. §2-6 10(a).
187
Cf. id. §2-61 1(1) (permitting the repudiating p arty to retract the repudiation).
188
See id . §2-7 13(1).
189
See id .
185
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breach.”190 This provision prevents the buyer from getting more damages
if the price continues to rise after the breach.191 Thus, although section
2-610(a) tells buyers that they may wait a reasonable time, section 2-713(1)
ensures that they may not. If buyers do not resort to remedies immediately,
then they may have to buy substitute goods at higher prices but will be
stuck with recovering only damages measured at the time of the breach.192
Some courts have seen another example of a conflict in the pre-2001
versions of section 9-306(2) and section 9-402(7).193 Section 9-306(2) says
that a security interest in property terminates when the secured party *114
permits the debtor to dispose of the property. 194 Section 9-402(7), however,
says that a filed financing statement establishing a security interest remains
effective if the debtor transfers property to another, even if the debtor has
the secured party’s knowledge and consent.195 For example, suppose that
a car dealer sells a car to a buyer on credit, retaining a security interest in
the car and filing a financing statement to perfect the security interest.
What happens if the buyer sells the car to a third party with the dealer’s
consent? Did the security interest terminate under section 9-306(2), or did
it continue under section 9-402(7)? The two sections appear to state
different rules.
2. Recommended Judicial Response
When courts confront conflicting sections in the UCC, they cannot
apply both of them. Unless they can find some way to reconcile the two
provisions (and thus conclude that no actual conflict exists), they must
decide to ignore one or both of the provisions. Fortunately, unlike most
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Id.
The price of the goods offered under the contract often rises after a breach
because sellers tend to breac h in situations when they can sell to other buyers for
a higher price.
192
See, e.g., Cosden Oil & Chem. Co. v. Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft, 736
F.2d 106 4, 10 72 (5th Cir. 198 4) (“T o interp ret 2.713’s ‘learned of the breach’
language to mean the tim e at which seller first co mmunicates his anticipatory
repudiation would undercut the time that 2.610 gives the aggrieved buyer to await
perfo rmance.”).
193
See, e.g., In re Cohutta Mills, Inc., 108 B.R. 815, 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
198 9) (no ting conflict and discussing po ssible resolutions).
194
See U.C.C. §9-306(1)(2) (1999). When the debtor disposes of the pro perty,
the security interest attaches to the proceeds. See 9 Hawkland, supra note 1,
§9-3 06:2 (noting, as an examp le, that a creditor might authorize a debtor to sell
invento ry subject to a security interest).
195
See U .C.C .§9-4 02(7) (1999 ).
191
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other statutes, the UCC contains a number of provisions that establish a
hierarchy among its rules. For instance, section 4-102(a) says: “If there is
conflict, [Article 4] governs Article 3, but Article 8 governs this Article.”196
Section 9-110 similarly says: “A security interest arising under section
2-401, 2-505, 2-711(3), or 2A-508(5) is subject to this article.”197 If a court
confronts a conflict between a provision in Article 3 and Article 4, or
between Article 9 and one of the Article 2 provisions enumerated in section
9-110, the court simply has to follow the priority stated.
In situations where the UCC does not establish a hierarchy, courts have
more difficulty. A customary canon of construction says that, when two
provisions in a statute conflict, courts should apply the more specific
provision. 198 This canon presumes that the legislature would have wanted
the less general provision to apply because they specifically thought about
the case that it concerns. Courts certainly can apply this canon if they find
it helpful. In many instances, however, both of the conflicting provisions
may appear about equally specific. In these cases, courts probably should
refuse to recognize either section as binding. When two provisions conflict,
then the statute really does not state a rule at all. The situation seems
analogous to one in which the drafters have created circular rules. The
court cannot follow the text of the statute because the *115 text has no
meaning.199 As discussed previously, however, the court can choose its
own common-law rule to resolve the case before it.200 The common-law
rule may follow one or the other of the two conflicting provisions, but it
need not.
IV. Recommendations for Other Drafting Errors
The previous part of this article suggested ways that courts might
address eight recurring patterns of drafting errors in the UCC. Not all
drafting errors in the UCC, however, fall within the patterns discussed.
Some may fit into other kinds of patterns, which occur less commonly.
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See U .C.C. §4-1 02(a) (20 01).
Id. §9 -110 .
198
See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 430 (1992)
(discussing the canon that the sp ecific co ntrols the general).
199
Although courts may decide to ignore provisions when they conflict and
create their ow n com mon rules, they sh ould not treat the pro visions as void for all
purpo ses. In many instances, the rules may app ly without conflicting. In these
situations, the UCC does state a rule. The principle of legislative supremacy
requires the courts to follow it.
200
See su pra P art III.A.2.a.
197
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Still others may be idiosyncratic in nature, not really belonging to any kind
of recurring pattern at all.201
A. Examples of Other Drafting Errors
Many parts of the UCC are intelligible only if you already know more
or less what they are attempting to say.202 Revised section 4-210(a)(1)
provides one example. This section states a rule for when a bank obtains a
security interest in a check or other item deposited for collection. The
section says: “A collecting bank has a security interest in an item . . .: (1)
in case of an item deposited in an account, to the extent to which credit
given for the item has been withdrawn or applied . . . .”203 The language of
Section 4-210(a)(1) is confusing because it lacks much of the detail
necessary to understand it. Only experience with commercial law issues
would enable a court to understand that the drafters were attempting to say:
“A collecting bank has a security interest in an item . . .: (1) in case of an
item deposited [ BY THE BANK’S CUSTOMER] in an account, to the
extent to which credit given [ TO THE CUSTOMER BY THE BANK] for
the item has been withdrawn [ BY THE CUSTOMER] *116 or applied [
BY THE BANK TO SET OFF AN EXISTING DEBT OWED BY THE
CUSTOMER].”204

201

See Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity:
Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 Harv. J. on
Legis. 123, 140-42 (1992) (distinguishing rec urring and idiosyncratic ambiguities).
202
See L awrence, supra note 48, at 66 2.
[O]ne must understand the entire statutory scheme in order to find answers
to basic questions. Although the drafters did a wonderful job of providing
an analytically tight system, a researcher must either know where to look or
search through the entire article to find the answer to a basic qu estion.
Id.

203

See U.C.C. §4-21 0(a)(1) (2001). This rule may determine whether a bank has
the status of a holder in due course because a bank gives “value” for an item (one
of the requirements for holder in d ue co urse status) to the extent that it acquires a
security interest in the item. See id. §4 -211 .
204
The italicized words are words that the drafters might ha ve ad ded to clarify
their intended meaning. For a similar UCC section that leave s out wo rds that would
make its meaning clearer, see U.C.C. §2-206(1)(b), which states that “an order... to
buy goods for prompt or current shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance
either by a pro mpt p romise to ship or by the pro mpt o r current shipm ent,” when it
should say that “an order... to buy goods for prompt or current shipment shall be
construed as [AS AN OFF ER ] inviting ac ceptance either by a pro mpt p romise to
ship or by the prompt or current shipment.”
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Another well-known example appears in section 2-104(1), which
defines the term “merchant.”205 This definition has great importance
because Article 2 contains thirteen rules that apply only to merchants, and
not to others who might buy or sell goods.206 Unfortunately, the definition
in section 2-104(1) has a major shortcoming. Section 2-104 indicates three
types of buyers or sellers of goods who might qualify as a merchant,
including a person who “by his occupation holds himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods . . . involved in the
transaction.”207 Unfortunately the provision does not specify when
knowledge or skill about practices is required or when knowledge or skill
about the goods is needed.208
When the drafters have left important parts of rules in the UCC
unstated, the special UCC interpretive solutions discussed above often offer
little assistance. Courts, for example, generally cannot rely on supplemental general principles209 to add a new rule because the problem is not that
a rule is missing, but rather that the words of the existing statute are
difficult to interpret. Courts also may have trouble deciding that the parties
agreed to change the rules by contract210 because they do not know what
the rules originally were supposed to be.
B. Principles for Addressing Other Drafting Errors
When courts encounter drafting errors that do not fall within the eight
patterns described in Part III above, they usually must employ general
methods of statutory interpretation. Many other sources discuss these
methods. 211 Individual courts, moreover, probably already have their own
strongly held views on the subject. This article, therefore, will not address
them. Instead, the following discussion identifies six principles about the
UCC and the UCC’s subject matter that may offer more specific guidance
to courts.
205

Id. §2 -104 (1).
See id . §2-1 04 cmt. 2 (d iscussing and citing these thirteen rules).
207
Id.
208
The official comments attempt to clarify this issue. See id. §2-104 cmts. 1 &
206

2.
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See su pra P art III.A.2.a.
See su pra P art III.B .2.
211
See, e.g., W illiam Eskridge, Dyn amic Statutory Interp retation (1994);
Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S.
Summers eds., 1991); Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Rules Which Go vern
the Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law (2d ed.
187 4).
210
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*117 1. Purposive Interpretation
A longstanding debate in the field of statutory interpretation has focused
on the question whether courts should interpret statutes according to their
purpose or instead to the objective meaning of their text.212 The UCC, for
better or worse, eliminates the need for judges to enter this debate. Section
1-102(1)--the first substantive provision of the UCC--specifically directs:
“This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies.”213 In recent years, some courts have overlooked
section 1-102(1) and used textualist methodology.214 No matter how strong
the arguments in favor of textualism, however, the principle of legislative
supremacy requires that courts interpret statutes in the way the legislature
directs.215
2. Presumption of Codification Not Revision
The drafters of the UCC clearly wanted to improve upon the preexisting
common law and statutes that governed the subjects that the UCC
addresses. Section 1-102(2), in fact, lists several of the drafter’s goals. 216
They wanted to “simplify, clarify, and modernize” the law. 217 They also
wanted to “permit the continued expansion of commercial practices.”218
They further sought to make the law “uniform . . . among the various
jurisdictions.”219
Apart from these goals, however, the drafters did not intend to
revolutionize the field of commercial law. Instead, in many instances, they
simply wanted to codify existing rules. Articles 2 and 3, for instance,
strived to eliminate some ambiguities in the earlier enacted Uniform Sales
Act and Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, but they generally sought to
212

See John F. M anning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum.
L. Rev. 1, 1-9 (2001) (discussing this debate).
213
U.C .C. §1 -102 (2001).
214
See, e.g., Corfan Banco Asuncion Paraguay v. Ocean Bank, 715 So. 2d 967,
970 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998 ); see also Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn’s Fading
Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Com mercial Code, 71 U . Colo. L. Rev.
541 , 570 -71 (2 000 ) (noting a dramatic d ecrea se in citation of Se ction 1 -102 ).
215
Courts often can determine the p urpose of rules either from the text or from
the official comments published with the UCC . See 1 Hawkland, supra note 1,
§1-102:10 (discussing these and other sources courts have relied o n in determining
the purpose of U CC provisions).
216
U.C .C. §1 -102 (2).
217
Id. §1 -102 (2)(a).
218
Id. §1 -102 (2)(b ).
219
Id. §1 -102 (2)(c).
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preserve most of their rules.220 Accordingly, when courts confront
ambiguities in the UCC they often may find it useful to consult preexisting*118 law.221 The preexisting law might be an earlier version of the
UCC, a prior statutory codification, or simply the common law. Unless
something indicates otherwise, courts should presume the drafters intended
only to preserve the previous rule.
3. Mostly Default Rules
The UCC, as noted previously, 222 specifically allows the parties by
contract to change most of its rules. Section 1-102(3) states: “The effect of
provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise
provided in this Act . . . .”223 Only a few exceptions exist. For example, in
general, parties may not waive or modify obligations to exercise diligence,
reasonableness, good faith, or care.224 Otherwise, they may change most of
the rules in the UCC. Accordingly, courts should view the UCC mostly as
a collection of default rules.
The ability of parties to contract around most of the rules in the UCC
should give courts some comfort when confronting gaps, conflicts, and
ambiguities in the UCC. No matter what choices they make, their decisions
may have only a limited effect on future cases. If parties in the future want
a different rule, they generally can establish one in their contracts.225 With
this idea in mind, courts often should have two goals when selecting the
meaning of a UCC provision that they otherwise cannot interpret. First,
courts should select the rule that most parties in the future will favor to save
them the effort of having to contract around it.226 Second, courts should
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See 1 Hawkland, supra note 1, §1-102:3 (discussing how the UC C sought to
improve the Uniform Sales Act); 4 id. §3-10 1:1 (d iscussing the UCC purpose with
respe ct to rep lacing the Unifo rm N egotiable Instruments Law).
221
The official comments often identify the preexisting law. See, e.g., U.C.C.
§2-2 01 cmt. (identifying Uniform Sales A ct Section 4 a s its pred ecessor).
222
See su pra P art III.B .2.
223
U.C .C. §1 -102 (3).
224
See id .
225
Although the parties may change a default rule, courts should realize that the
choice of default rule does matter to some extent. See Russell Korob kin, The Status
Quo Bias and C ontract De fault Rules, 83 C ornell L. Rev. 608, 666 (19 98) (arguing
on the basis of empirical evidence that parties making contracts tend to prefer
whatever default rule is chose n).
226
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Pro per R ole of a Ta rget’s
Mana gement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1182 (1981)
(corporate law should supply “standard form ‘contracts’ of the sort shareholders
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make clear what choice they have made so that parties in the future may
revise the rule by agreement if they choose.
4. Need for Uniformity
In many instances, when a court confronts an ambiguity in the UCC,
another court from another jurisdiction already will have considered*119
it. Although courts do not have to follow UCC precedents from other
jurisdictions, they often should do that. Nonuniformity among jurisdictions
may hinder the planning of interstate commercial transactions and increase
the cost of resolving disputes.
Some courts may hesitate to follow precedent from other jurisdictions
that they consider less than ideal. They may reason: “Uniformity is
important, but legislative supremacy requires this court to interpret and
apply statutes our legislature has passed. If this court thinks that a statute
has a particular meaning, it should not ignore what it thinks is the
legislative command and follow a different interpretation by a court in
another jurisdiction.” This objection has some validity, but courts also
should keep three points in mind before adopting it. First, their legislatures
also have enacted section 1-102(2)(c).227 Section 1-102(2)(c), as noted
above, specifically identifies the creation of uniformity as one of the
underlying principles of the UCC.228 The principle of legislative supremacy
also requires courts to follow this directive. Second, no court of last resort
can resolve conflicts among jurisdictions.229 Accordingly, if they create
ambiguities, the ambiguities will necessitate creating new uniform
legislation. Judges should avoid imposing this burden. Third, as noted
above, most of the rules in the UCC are default provisions.230 Parties
generally can change them by contract if they desire. As a result, in many
instances, courts should follow precedent from another jurisdiction even if
they might have chosen a different result in the first instance. If parties

would be likely to choose.”); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability
Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale L.J. 353, 361 (1988) (offering as default
rule “the contract that most well-informed persons would have ado pted if they were
to bargain about the matter”). But see Ian Ayres & Robert G ertner, F illing Gaps in
Incomple te Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87,
97-101 (1989) (suggesting that in some instances the law should impose default
rules that the parties do not want to enc ourage the p arties to address the issue).
227
See U .C.C. §1-1 02(2)(c).
228
See id .
229
See su pra P art II.B .
230
See su pra P art III.B .2.
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disfavor the interpretation, they generally can agree in the future to a
different rule by contract.
5. Inclusive Approaches to Scope
Many ambiguities in the UCC relate to its scope. For example, Article
2 by its terms applies only to transactions in “goods.”231 Courts, however,
may confront hybrid cases which involve both goods and services.232
Similarly, courts may encounter contracts that resemble negotiable
instruments, but that do not meet all of the formal requirements for a
negotiable instrument.233
In these cases, if courts believe that the UCC’s rules should apply for
policy reasons, then they generally may apply them. If the UCC does not
apply to a transaction, then the common law usually applies.234 *120 Courts
remain free to create and reshape the common law and, in the process, they
may look to the UCC for guidance. Indeed, many current contract rules that
apply in common-law cases originated in the UCC. 235 The drafters of the
UCC identified transactions that the UCC must govern, but that does not
mean that they wanted to bar its rules from applying in other contexts.236
V. Conclusion
This article concerns the problem of drafting errors in the UCC.
Although the total number of drafting errors is great, the UCC’s special
characteristics make many patterns of drafting errors easier to address than
comparable mistakes in other kinds of statutes. Most importantly, the UCC
generally requires courts to consider supplemental general principles of law
and private agreements. Accordingly, wherever the drafters of the UCC

231

See U .C.C. §2-1 02 (“Unless the context othe rwise requires, this Article
app lies to transaction s in goo ds....”).
232
See 1 Hawkland, supra note 1, §2-102:4 (2000 ) (discussing different
approaches used by courts in treating cases involving combinations of goods and
non-good s, like servic es).
233
See U.C.C. §3-1 04(a) (listing the forma l requirements of a ne gotiab le
instrument).
234
See su pra P art III.A.2.a.
235
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of the Law of Co ntracts § 208 repo rter’s note
(1981) (noting §20 8’s rule o n unco nscionability originated in U .C.C. §2-3 02).
236
See, e.g., U.C.C. §3-104 cmt. 2 (2001) (suggesting “it may be appropriate,
consistent with the principles stated in Section 1-102(2), for a court to apply one or
more provisions o f Article 3 to the writing by analogy, taking into account the
expectations of the parties and the differences between the writing and an
instrument governed by Article 3.”).
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through inadvertence forgot to include something in the statutes, courts
generally can fill in the gap with a common-law rule or determine if the
parties have implicitly altered the rule by contract. This supplementation
does not violate any principle of legislative supremacy.
Other kinds of drafting errors do not lend themselves to special
solutions unique to the UCC. Instead, courts must resolve them using
ordinary canons and principles of statutory interpretation. Several factors,
however, simplify the task for courts, or at least reduce the stakes. The
UCC directs courts to follow the purpose of the statute and to make the law
uniform. In addition, it does not bar courts from applying the UCC in cases
where its scope is unclear. In any event, because the UCC mostly concerns
default rules, interpretations of the statute usually do not create insuperable
obstacles for parties who want different rules to apply to future transactions.
The UCC has served the commercial law well for fifty years and will
continue to do so for a long time in the future. Courts have come to treat
it with respect and even admiration. The presence of drafting errors
detracts only a little from its other great strengths. If courts can find ways
of dealing with these errors, they can reduce their deleterious effects.

